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INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of securities law fraud litigation during the
last decade under federal statutes and rules ' is now well recognized.
As learning has advanced, plaintiffs' lawyers have become more aware
of the many possible avenues for recovery. Federal law has not only
provided a fertile source of substantive theory, but through the Federal
'E.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-l (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the 1933 Act] ; SEC Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971) ; SEC Reg.
14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -103 (1971) (proxy rules) (promulgated under Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8n (1970) [hereinafter cited as the
1934 Act]) ; Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
Although rule lOb-5, the primary regulation upon which most securities law
private suits rest, was promulgated in 1942, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), only during the last decade has extensive private litigation
utilizing the rule been prevalent. (Only 54 cases were decided under rule 10b-5
during the period 1946-1962. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 627, 687-90 (1963). Since that
time the volume of litigation has grown to well over 100 reported cases each year.)
The best known application of the rule has been in cases involving misrepresentations
and nondisclosures in connection with purchases and sales of securities. E.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part & remanded, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969),
on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part & remanded,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). It has also been used to challenge corporate action
in mergers, liquidations, sales of control, corporate purchases or sales of securities,
and similar transactions. Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAW.
1289 (1971) ; Ruder, Challenging Corporate Action Under Rule 10b-5, 25 Bus. LAW.
75 (1969). Similarly, the federal proxy rules have been used to attack activities in
the corporate takeover setting, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826
(N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd in part & remanded, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated
& remanded, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), as has § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, e.g., Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). Broker-
dealer duties to their customers have been enforced under rule lOb-5, e.g., Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), modifying & aff'g 283 F. Supp.
417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), and customers have also felt the rule's bite, e.g., A.T. Brod
& Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). Most cases involving attacks on
multiple defendants have included demands for extremely large amounts as damages.
The analysis in this Article will assume the existence of such demands in derivative
or class actions based upon complicated factual circumstances.
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rules dealing with class actions 2
and derivative suits,3 has offered procedural advantages for plaintiffs.
As securities law litigation has grown, imaginative plaintiffs have
included greater numbers of persons and corporations as defendants.
With increasing frequency, securities fraud complaints are naming as
defendants not only primary wrongdoers, but many whose activities are
collateral or secondary to the primary wrong. For instance, in
Carpenter v. Hall,4 a case alleging misrepresentations and market
manipulations by Westec Corporation insiders, the plaintiff named
ninety-three persons, partnerships, and corporations as defendants. The
complaint alleges that the primary defendants, E. M. Hall, Jr., and
James W. Williams, should share liability with other defendants who
"aided and abetted" or "conspired with" the primary defendants. These
"secondary defendants" include associates of Hall and Williams, an
accounting firm, brokerage firms, banks and other lenders, individuals
who purchased stock and arranged loans, and officers and employees of
many of the corporate and partnership defendants.' In multiple de-
fendant cases like the Westec litigation, the participation, degree of
knowledge, and agreement by the various defendants in the wrongdoing
will be extremely varied. So too, the nature of the duties owed to the
public will vary. Some of the defendants, such as corporate officers,
will owe fiduciary obligations to plaintiff shareholders. Others, such
as accountants and brokers, will owe obligations stemming from their
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3Id. 23.1.
4311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
3 Complaint at 2-3, Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
The Westec litigation promises to continue for several years. The principal case
has already survived a motion to dismiss, at least temporarily, see Ernst & Ernst v.
United States Dist. Court, 439 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1971). In addition, there has
been a rash of actions by parties connected with the Westec bankruptcy. In re
Westec Corp., 434 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant versus bankruptcy trustee
for performance of a contract); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371
(S.D. Tex. 1969) (disqualification of counsel in a suit by brokerage firm against
one of its officers) ; H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinman, Hochstin & Trotta, Inc., [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[ 92,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 414
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1969) (shareholder versus brokerage firm to determine status of a
straddle option when trading in Westec stock was suspended) ; Wyndham Associates
v. Bintliff, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1192,016 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968) (removal to
Texas of suit by Westec shareholders suing insiders) ; Goodkind v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 44 F.R.D. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (motion to require
production of documents) ; Cosmos Bank v. Bintliff, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. f191,969 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (debtor bank versus owners of Westec
stock placed as collateral) ; Schneider v. Sears, 265 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(removal to Texas of suit by Westec shareholders suing insiders). Several criminal
cases have also been produced, including United States v. Williams, 424 F.2d 344
(5th Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
The author of this Article has acted as consultant to a law firm representing a
lender who has been named as a defendant in Carpenter v. Hall, but who also qualified
as part of the class of plaintiffs on whose behalf the suit has been brought.
19721
600 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
professional status. Under such circumstances, the problems faced by
courts in attempting to reach just results for all parties are immensely
complicated.
This Article is directed primarily toward discussion of liability
for aiding and abetting and for conspiracy. However, since courts
tend to confuse doctrine when dealing with these theories of so-called
"secondary liability," it is also important to understand other theories
that may be used to impose liability upon defendants who are not the
primary wrongdoers.
At the outset one distinction should be emphasized. In most
multiple defendant securities law suits some of the defendants will be
primarily engaged in the wrongdoing, while others will be engaged only
in a secondary fashion. This distinction between primary and sec-
ondary wrongdoers provides a method for determining liability and for
allocating rights among wrongdoers. For purposes of this Article,
persons owing direct duties to the public will be classified as primary
wrongdoers. Those whose liabilities arise only because another has
violated the law will be called secondary wrongdoers. In most cases
those who are only secondarily liable will be less culpable than those
who are primarily liable.
After contrasting the doctrines of conspiracy and aiding and abet-
ting with other liability theories, this Article will examine the theories
of contribution, indemnification, and in pari delicto as tools for deter-
mining relative rights and liabilities in multiple defendant cases. In
general, the following conclusions will be reached:
(1) In most cases liability under the securities laws will be im-
posed because the defendant has been a participant in the primary
wrongdoing or has violated an independent duty.
(2) Liability may also be imposed through use of controlling
persons sections of the Securities Acts or through use of agency
doctrine.
(3) Imposition of liability upon defendants utilizing an aiding
and abetting theory requires proof that the secondary defendant knew
of the illegal act and rendered positive assistance to the wrongdoers,
whereas imposition of liability under a conspiracy theory requires proof
that the defendant knowingly entered into an agreement the purpose of
which was the consummation of an illegal act.
(4) The defense of in pari delicto will probably be available only
where the party against whom the defense is asserted is as culpable or
more culpable than the party asserting the defense.
[Vol.120:597
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(5) Indemnification is likely to be awarded only where differences
in fault are clear.
(6) Contribution between defendants is the most likely means of
limiting excessive liability for multiple defendants.
I. AVAILABLE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
In adopting the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Congress recognized that persons other than the primary
participants in a securities transaction might incur liability. Both the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act contain so-called controlling persons sec-
tions, which are available to impose securities law liability upon persons
who did not participate directly in the illegal course of conduct.'
Neither the courts nor the SEC have been content to rest secondary
liability upon the controlling persons sections, but have instead turned
to agency theory, to principles of misrepresentation and deceit, to tippee
liability theory, and finally to aiding and abetting and conspiracy doc-
trines. Proper understanding of the role played by the latter two
doctrines requires that attention also be paid to the other doctrines.
A. Agency Theory Contrasted With the Controlling Persons Sections
The most obvious approach to secondary liability under the federal
securities laws lies in the controlling persons sections of the 1933 and
1934 Acts. The 1933 Act provides that anyone controlling a person
liable under section 11 or section 12 shall also be liable "unless the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of
the controlled person is alleged to exist." 7 The 1934 Act creates sim-
ilar liability but contains a slightly different defense. It provides that
the controlling person will be liable "unless the controlling person
acted in good faith." 8 It also contains a requirement that the person
6 1933 Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970) ; 1934 Act § 20, id. § 78t.
7 The 1933 Act provides the following in § 15:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding
with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under [sections 11 or 12], shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
8 The 1934 Act contains the following provisions in § 20:
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
19721
602 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.120:597
"did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation." ' Both sections place the burden of proof on the defendant."
The apparent purpose of the controlling persons provisions is to
cope with attempts to avoid liability by causing others to engage in the
unlawful activity. One of the House reports dealing with section 15 of
the 1933 Act states that the so-called "dummy provisions" were "cal-
culated to place liability upon a person who acted through another, ir-
respective of whether a direct agency relationship existed but dependent
upon the actual control exercised by the one party over the other." "1
The term control is not specifically defined, allowing the possi-
bility of broad definition. According to the drafters of the 1934 Act,
the failure to define control was deliberate:
It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the term. It
would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to
anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be
exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock
ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well known that
actual control sometimes may be exerted through ownership
of much less than a majority of the stock of a corporation
either by the ownership of such stock alone or through such
ownership in combination with other factors.12
The broad approach taken toward the definition might suggest that the
number of persons falling into the "control" category would be rather
large. The use of sections 15 and 20 has been limited, however, be-
cause of the special defenses contained in the sections.
Two cases, Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co."3 and Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton,4 illustrate the applicability of the special
defenses and the desire of plaintiffs to avoid them. Both cases contain
contentions that the controlling persons sections are not the exclusive
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any
act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the
provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder through or
by means of any other person.
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
9Id.
101933 Act §15, 15 U.S.C. §77o (1970); 1934 Act §20(a), 15 U.S.C. §78t(a)
(1970).
11 H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
12 H.R. R,. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
13 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'g [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 191,565 (S.D. Cal. 1964), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942, cert. dis-
missed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
14297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part & remanded,
422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
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method of imposing liability and that therefore the special defenses
found in the Acts do not apply. They also illustrate the use of agency
doctrine as an alternative to the controlling persons sections.
Both the Kamen and Hopkins cases involved allegations that
brokerage firms should be liable for the activities of their employees.
In the Kamen case a brokerage firm gave two employees, Ross and
Grossinger, the responsibility of obtaining the listed business of over-
the-counter nonmember broker-dealers. The two men engaged in
illegal activities by making repurchase guarantees to various broker-
dealers. In the Hopkins case, W. E. Hutton & Co., a stock brokerage
firm, was employed by Trice Production Company to act as agent in
the sale of production payments carved out of certain oil and gas
properties owned by Trice. In the course of the sale to Hopkins, mis-
representations and omissions were made by LaPiere, manager of
Hutton's oil and gas department. Hopkins sued Hutton for rescission
of the transaction.
Both cases presented obvious opportunities for arguments to be
made based upon agency principles, since in both cases suit was brought
against brokerage firms alleging that their agents had engaged in illegal
activities. In the Hopkins case, the Fourth Circuit relied upon agency
principles to sustain liability against Hutton. It stated that the Hutton
partners had given their agent actual and apparent authority to provide
Hopkins with information and that the agent had acted within the
scope of his employment in offering the production payments to
Hopkins. It concluded, "Hutton is liable, under familiar principles, for
the tortious representations of its agent," citing sections of the Restate-
inent of Agency to support its conclusion." The use of agency prin-
ciples to support liability in securities litigation suggests that the semi-
codified principles of the common law as set forth in the Restatement of
Agency and Restatement of Torts are becoming part of the securities
law civil liability framework.
16
To a certain extent common law principles will naturally provide
reference points for application of express and implied liability pro-
visions under securities law." For instance, the Restatement of Agency
15 422 F.2d at 1130 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257-58 (1958)).
16 The Fourth Circuit seems to support this view in its Hopkins decision. See
422 F.2d at 1130. Likewise characterization of private remedies under rule 10b-5 as
based upon tort theory, carries with it the implication that tort concepts will be
utilized to interpret the rule. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round:
Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv.
423, 431 (1968). For treatment of the implied private right of action theories, see
id. 430-33; Comment, Private Rights From Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use
of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 454 (1968). See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 413-14 (1964).
17 The creation of implied remedies carries with it analogies to the experience
and learning of the common law.
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provides several theories of liability that are consistent with accepted
securities law policy. First, the principal will be subject to liability for
the consequences of his agent's act if the principal intentionally causes
that act to be performed. 8 He will also be subject to liability if he is
reckless in giving orders, in employing his agents, or in supervising the
activity of his agents.'9 He may also be liable for failing to perform a
nondelegable duty.
2 0
In terms of the distinction made earlier between liability based upon
"primary" activity and liability based upon "secondary" activity, these
agency theories can be classed as primary liability theories because
liability is premised upon duties owed directly by the principal. In
contrast, a separate section of the Restatement of Agency providing
that the principal will be liable for unauthorized tortious conduct when
the "agent" (described as a servant) commits a tort while acting in
the scope of his employment 2' is more properly described as based upon
secondary liability concepts. In the latter case the principal (master)
has been made liable through application of the definitions of "servant"
and "scope of employment" unrelated to the principal's direct par-
ticipation in the prohibited conduct.22
Application of ordinary agency doctrine to fraudulent misrepre-
sentations of agents acting within the scope of their employment may
in any event be subsumed by section 257, which deals specifically with
liability for loss caused by misrepresentations of an agent.21 Section
257 provides:
A principal is subject to liability for loss caused to another
by the other's reliance upon a tortious representation of a
servant or other agent, if the representation is:
(a) authorized;
(b) apparently authorized; or
(c) within the power of the agent to make for the
principal.24
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1958). See also 4 RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§870, 876, 877 (1939).
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
2 0 Id. § 214.
2 'Id. §219(1).
22 Id. §§ 220-27 (who is a servant), §§228-37 (scope of employment). These
sections and definitions are thought by many to offer the courts an opportunity to
apply the so-called "deep pocket" doctrine, by which liability in an appropriate case





The question whether an agent is authorized, apparently author-
ized, or possesses so-called agency power may be a complicated one.25
In the Hopkins case, the Hutton firm was held liable for the misrepre-
sentations of its agents even though it did not know of or authorize
those representations. The court held that Hutton's agent possessed
sufficient apparent authority to subject Hutton to liability under
"familiar [agency] principles." 26 In so doing the court evaluated the
reasonableness of the representations made by the Hutton agent.
A different result was reached in the Kamen case, utilizing the
same principles. There the court found that it could not reasonably
have appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant's agents were acting in
a way that their employer would have authorized. Since the guar-
anteed profit plan offered by the agents was patently unusual, the court
held that the plaintiff should have inquired further regarding the
agents' authority.
7
The above illustrative discussion of agency theory suggests that
courts will not hesitate to apply the "familiar principles" of the Restate-
inent of Agency in appropriate cases. This agency approach carries a
basic limitation, however, since use of agency theory depends in the
first instance upon the existence of an agency relationship.2" Unless the
agency relationship exists, agency theory cannot be utilized. As a
result, plaintiffs will often find it difficult to use agency theory. If the
many possible secondary defendants, such as banks, accountants, law-
yers and others, have neither agreed to act for the primary wrongdoer
nor agreed that he may act for them, the search for a so-called "deep
pocket defendant" in the securities law field will turn to other legal
theories.
B. The Contention That the Controlling Persons Provisions
Provide an Exclusive Remedy
In both the Kamen and Hopkins cases defendants denied liability
under the controlling persons sections, arguing that they did not have
25 This complexity is found in Restatement sections that intertwine tort and
contract questions when dealing with misrepresentations. For example:
If the statement is one which, if true, the agent would be authorized or ap-
parently authorized to make, the principal is subject to liability for it, al-
though deceitfully made, in accordance with the principles underlying the
rules stated in Sections 162 and 196. A general agent can bind his principal
by representations made within the scope of his power to act, as stated in
Section 161, although he is neither authorized nor apparently authorized,
and although the principal is undisclosed, as stated in Section 194. False
representations with regard to his authority made by the agent to one
dealing with him do not cause the principal to be liable in deceit.
Id. § 257, comment a.
26 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970).
27 382 F.2d at 696.
28 An agency relationship exists only if there has been a manifestation of willing-
ness and consent by both the agent and the principal that the agent is to act for
the principal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1958).
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reasonable grounds to believe that the fraudulent activities of their
agents were taking place. They argued further that the controlling
persons provisions of the securities laws provide the exclusive method
of imposing liability upon secondary defendants.2 9  Although the ques-
tion was not treated explicitly by either the district court or the court
of appeals in the Kamen case, it was treated in proceedings before the
Supreme Court. The SEC prepared a brief supporting plaintiff's peti-
tion for certiorari," and after certiorari was granted " filed a brief as
amicus curiae." These two briefs and the Kamen decision were com-
mented upon extensively by the district court in the Hopkins case " and
that court's interpretation was endorsed by the Fourth Circuit.34 In
combination, these cases and the SEC briefs amount to substantial
authority regarding the exclusivity question.
The Commission's concern regarding the outcome of the Kamen
case in part rested upon the special nature of the activity involved." It
argued that liability of a broker-dealer for violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws by employees of the firm is not
restricted by the controlling persons provisions of the federal securities
laws.36 Secondly, it argued that a violation of the securities laws by
employees of a broker-dealer acting within the scope of their employ-
ment is necessarily a violation by the firm itself and that the degree of
fault on the part of the firm is a factor to be considered only in deter-
mining the sanction, if any, to be imposed. 7
29 See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970).
30 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Certiorari, Paul H. Aschkar
& Co. v. Kamen & Co., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
31390 U.S. 942 (1968). The writ was later dismissed by agreement between
the parties. 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
32 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co.,
390 U.S. 942 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SEC Brief].
33 297 F. Supp. at 1211-13.
34 422 F.2d at 1130.
35 Activity involving broker-dealers. See SEC Brief, supra note 32, at 1-3.
36Id. 9.
37 Id. 14. It stated:
The legislative history of the controlling-persons provisions supports this
analysis of their precise focus. The original Senate version of the 1933
Act contained a number of provisions designed "to aid in preventing directors
from evading the liabilities incident to signing the registration statement * * *."
This draft of the Act dealt with the use of a "dummy" signer of a registra-
tion statement and made the fraudulent use of a "dummy" unlawful. The
House version, which contained registration and antifraud provisions very
much like those eventually adopted, contained no sections expressly dealing
either with "dummies" or with controlling persons. In conference these
"'dummy provisions' which were calculated to place liability upon a person
who acted through another, irrespective of whether a direct agency relation-
ship existed but dependent upon the actual control exercised by one party
over the other * * * [were) welded into one and incorporated as a new
section in the substitute." The "new section" is what is now the con-
trolling-persons provision of Section 15. Thus, that section was the result
of congressional concern with the special problem presented by the use of
"dummies", and was not designed to govern the usual employment situation.
Id. 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
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In reaching the first conclusion, the Commission contended that
the controlling persons provisions of section 15 and section 20 were not
"designed to govern the usual employment situation." " It argued
that traditional agency law would place liability upon the principal if the
agent had been actually authorized, apparently or ostensibly authorized,
or had acted within his agency powers.39 The Commission continued:
We submit . . . that the controlling-persons provisions
under which the court analyzed the federal aspect of peti-
tioner's claim are essentially irrelevant in the ordinary
employer-employee context, as exists in this case. These pro-
visions were designed to reach situations in which there are
technical legal barriers between the persons in fact responsible
for violations of the securities acts and those injured by the
violations. . . . [T]he controlling-persons provisions were
designed to avoid those barriers by, for example, piercing the
corporate veil to reach controlling stockholders. They were
intended to enlarge, not restrict, the scope of vicarious liability
otherwise arising under the securities acts. Hence, the ex-
ceptions set forth in those provisions are applicable only when
it is necessary to invoke these expanded premises of liability.
Conversely, they are not applicable here because respondents'
liability may be and should be determined directly under the
antifraud provisions themselves."
In Hopkins, the court relied upon the Commission's position in
Kamen to hold that the section 15 defenses do not apply in the brokerage
context when liability is premised upon traditional agency principles.
It stated:
What legislative history there is does not indicate that Con-
gress intended Section 15, originally or as amended, to serve
as a limitation on liability.41
3 8 Id.
39Id. 15 (quoting RESTATEMNENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §257 & comment b,
§261 & comment a (1957)).
40 SEC Brief, supra note 32, at 12-13.
41297 F. Supp. at 1211. The Fourth Circuit agreed. 422 F.2d at 1130. The
Commission stated its policy as follows:
Many, probably a majority, of the frauds practiced by securities firms involve
misconduct by employees-typically by sales representatives who make false
or unfounded representations with respect to securities. It is the Commis-
sion's experience that from time to time salesmen actually whet the ap-
petites of gullible public customers by representing that they are breaking
their employers' rules by giving them a special deal; for example, by giving
them more than the prescribed quota of a new issue of securities. But, what-
ever the representations made by the salesmen or other employees of the
broker-dealer, we have found that investors customarily rely primarily on the
integrity, reputation, and responsibility of the firm itself rather than on
the character of the particular employee with whom they happen to be
dealing. It is the firm that is accepting and retaining the profits from the
transactions, as Kamen & Co. did in this case; and it is the firm to whom
the customer should be permitted and expected to look if his trust has been
abused.
SEC Brief, supra note 32, at 23.
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This latter interpretation is consistent with liberal constructions of
other sections of the Securities Acts found in other cases. Good support
for the nonexclusivity view appears in cases dealing with implied
remedies. 2 These cases have firmly rejected the contention that the
defenses contained in the express provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
should be read into remedies granted by implication under the Secu-
rities Acts.4 3 It seems likely that the Commission's position in Kamen
will prevail and that the specific defenses of the controlling persons sec-
tions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts will be available only in those situa-
tions in which use of those sections is necessary to impose liability.4 If
other theories of liability such as agency, aiding and abetting, con-
spiracy, or direct participation are used, then the "special" defenses of
the controlling persons sections will apparently be unavailable."
42 The doctrine of implied private remedies is firmly established with respect
to: the federal proxy rules, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); the Williams Act takeover legisla-
tion, Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969) ; the Investment Company Act, Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) ; and rule lOb-5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 92 S. Ct. 165, 169 n.9 (1971). See generally cases cited in Franklin
Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1341-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
Attacks have been made upon the validity of the private rights doctrine and con-
siderable debate has ensued regarding the desirability of the doctrine. See Com-
ment, Private Rights From Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63
Nw. U.L. Rtv. 454 (1968), and articles cited in Ruder, Current Developments in the
Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5,
26 Bus. LAW. 1289-90 n.4 (1971).
43 For instance, such arguments have been rejected with regard to the statute
of limitations, Jordan Bldg. Co. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F2d 47, 50-51 (7th
Cir. 1968), revg 282 F. Supp. 87, 92-93 (N.D. Ill. 1967). For extensive discussion
and support for creation of a federal statute of limitations based upon the 1- and
3-year statutes contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see A. BRomERG, SEcuarrias
LAW: FRAuD § 12.9 (1967); 6 L. Loss, SEcurrixs REGuLATIoN 3898-900 (Supp.
1969) ; Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in. 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to
Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1967) ; Israels, Book Review, 77 YA.E L.J. 1585,
1591 (1968). With regard to buyer's remedies, see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1961).
44 This prediction of outcome should not be interpreted as acquiescence by the
author in the predicted result. See generally articles cited in Ruder, Current Devel-
opments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue
Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289-90 n.4 (1971).
45 Compare text following note 180 infra.
Strangely, an opposite conclusion may result through recent developments in the
implied remedies field. The cases supporting implication of remedies have done
so with differing degrees of preciseness and with differing attitudes. The most
liberal approach has been taken by the Seventh Circuit in Jordan Bldg. Corp. v.
Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968). In that case, a buyer of
securities claimed a private right of action under rule lob-5 despite the existence
of an express similar right under §.12(2) of the 1933 Act and an implied private
right under rule 15cl-2. In a sweeping statement, the court stated that the remedies
supplied under the 1933 and 1934 Acts are "cumulative and not mutually exclusive."
Id. at 51. Recently, the Tenth Circuit decided Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th
Cir. 1970), a case dealing with a rule 10b-5 claim by a buyer who might also have
had a private right of recovery under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Although the court
recognized that a private right of action exists under rule 10b-5, it stated its deter-
mination to incorporate the provisions of § 12(2) into the rule lOb-5 action as follows:
Had appellants invoked Section 12(2) alone our task in formulating the
proper legal standards for recovery would have been simplified. We note,
[Vo1.120:597
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C. Related Theories of Primary Liability
The search for alternative liability theories is not likely to be
limited to plaintiffs. Courts are well known for a tendency to support
results with alternative doctrine. A good example of this tendency to
search for alternate doctrine appears in Ross v. Licht.", That case in-
volved the purchase of stock from plaintiffs by corporate insiders at
$120 per share when the insiders knew prospects were good for sales
to others at substantially higher prices. The court held that the de-
fendants who controlled and managed the corporation were insiders
subject to liability. Three other defendants were dentists who were
described as knowledgeable regarding the corporation, but who were
neither directors nor employees. All of the defendants were held to
have known of the proposed public and private offerings at the time
they purchased shares from the plaintiffs."t In dealing with the liability
of the dentists, the court attacked the problem in three ways. First, it
held that the dentists were corporate insiders because "they had access
to information which should be used 'only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone.' "48 Secondly, the court held
that if the dentists were not insiders "they would seem to have been
'tippees' (persons given information by insiders in breach of trust) and
subject to the same duty as insiders." 49 Finally, the court held that in
however, that a private action under Rule lob-5 originated in the need for
a seller's remedy where none had otherwise been provided. Once a remedy was
implied for the seller, it was extended to include the buyer even though relief
was already available to him under Section 12(2). Since in this case recovery
is sought under both provisions, we resolve any conflict between them in favor
of Section 12(2), where the statutory remedy is explicit.
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted). The Gilbert case seems to represent a deviation from
cases such as Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961), which have held
that the limitations of § 12(2) need not be read into a buyer's action under rule lOb-5.
It stands as limited support for the theory that the defenses of the controlling
persons sections must be read into secondary liability actions.
Although control was clear in both Kamen and Hopkin,, the question of ex-
clusivity of the controlling persons sections could arise in another context if the
control by the defendant over the plaintiffs could not be demonstrated. In that
circumstance the defense could contend that if the defendant was not a primary
participant in the fraud and neither controlled nor was controlled by a primary par-
ticipant he should not be liable.
46 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
47263 F. Supp. at 405. Under familiar rule 10b-5 principles, the corporate
insider would be subject to liability for failing to make disclosures while purchasing.
See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd in part &' rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part & rev'd in part,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (SEC proceeding establishing the elements of a rule
lob-5 violation in the context of a commission injunctive proceeding); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (a private action holding that
privity of contract is not a necessary element for recovery).
48 263 F. Supp. at 409 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
(1961)).
49 263 F. Supp. 410.
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any event they "would be equally liable with the other defendants for
aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5." '0
1. Tippee Liability Distinguished
For several years, the Ross case was important because it was the
only case in which a court had imposed liability upon a so-called "tip-
ping" theory. In setting forth a theory condemning use of inside in-
formation received from a corporate insider, the court in the Ross
case 51 relied upon the concept advanced by Professor Loss that one
who knowingly receives information from another in breach of trust
should be liable under rule lOb-5 in the same degree as the insider
himself.52 The Ross court also cited In re Cady, Roberts & Co.5" as
supporting the tippee theory. In that proceeding, the SEC imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon a broker who had sold stock of Curtiss-
Wright Corporation after receiving a tip from his brokerage partner,
who was a Curtiss-Wright director, that the corporation was planning
to reduce its dividend. In determining that the broker had violated
rule 10b-5, the Commission defined corporate insiders as including
"those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and
privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in
trading in its securities." " It stated:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements;
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavail-
able to those with whom he is dealing.55
This definition was quoted with approval by the Second Circuit in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 6 but that court seemed to expand the
theory by stating that anyone who trades while "in possession of
material inside information" owes a duty of disclosure. 57  The court
applied its test by holding that officers and employees, including Darke,
BO ld.
51 Id.
523 L. Loss, SECURTIES REGULATION 1450-51 (2d ed. 1961). Regarding tippee
liability generally, see Arnold, Guidelines for the Banker "Insider" or "Tippee": The
Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch Decisions, 86 BAN=IG L.J. 319 (1969) ; Comment,
Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 372 (1971).
5340 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
54Id. at 912.
551d. (footnote omitted).
56401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
57 Id.
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a geologist, would be considered to have the necessary special relation-
ship. Since the Commission had not brought suit against tippees of
those insiders, the Second Circuit was not faced with the tippee liability
question. In dictum, however, it stated:
As Darke's "tippees" are not defendants in this action, we
need not decide whether, if they acted with actual or con-
structive knowledge that the material information was un-
disclosed, their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as
the conduct of their insider source, though we note that it
certainly could be equally reprehensible. 8
Recently, the Commission held in a disciplinary proceeding that
tippees have an obligation to refrain from trading based upon inside
information. In the Investors Management proceeding,59 the Commis-
sion dealt with use of non-public information by institutional investors.
The proceeding involved review of a hearing examiner's decision that
certain institutional investors had violated rule 10b-5 by selling stock
of Douglas Aircraft Co. without disclosing to the purchasers material
information received from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith,
Inc.6° as to a reduction in Douglas earnings. The Commission referred
to both the Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur cases, and stated
that the requisite elements for the imposition of responsibility upon
tippees were:
that the information in question be material and non-public;
that the tippee, whether he receives the information directly
or indirectly, know or have reason to know that it was non-
public and had been obtained improperly by selective revela-
tion or otherwise, and that the information be a factor in his
decision to effect the transaction.6'
58 Id. at 852-53. The tippee obligation question has been raised in several cases
dealing with claims by those who have received false tips. These cases acknowledge
existence of a tippee obligation, although reaching different results with regard to
whether the defense of in pari delicto was available to the defendants. Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (defense allowed); Wohl v. Blair &
Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (motion to strike defense overruled) ; Nathanson
v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defense denied).
The in pari delicto defense is discussed at text accompanying notes 281-308 infra.
59 I n re Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
60 Although none of the parties petitioned for review of the examiner's decision,
the Commission initiated review on its own motion, stating:
since we felt that the legal issues raised respecting the obligations of persons
other than corporate insiders who receive non-public corporate information
(sometimes referred to as "tippees") had significant implications for the
securities industry and investing public, we deemed it appropriate to consider
those issues and express our views on them.
Id. at 80,515 (footnote omitted).
61 Id. at 80,519 (footnote omitted).
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It rejected contentions that the recipient himself must occupy a special
relationship to the issuer and that he must have actual knowledge that
information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty.6 2
The similarity between the standard adopted for so-called "tippees"
by the SEC in the Investors Management case and the standard in
existence for corporate insiders points to the conclusion that the liability
of tippee defendants is not "secondary," but is "primary." Their
liability is dependent directly upon use of non-public inside information
for their own benefit. It does not depend upon their indirect participa-
tion in the activities of the primary wrongdoers.
The Commission apparently subscribed to this view, since it dealt
with tippee liability questions entirely in the direct sense. It did not
discuss at all the finding of the hearing examiner that the respondents
had "aided and abetted violations of the antifraud provisions." 63
2. Tort Theories and State of Mind
A fertile source of additional doctrine lies in the tort law dealing
with deceit.6" This theory imposes liability upon a defendant for
breach of an obligation that is his alone, so that his violation becomes
primary rather than secondary. The deceit theory raises the further
possibility that a dividing line may be constructed based upon differ-
ences in the degree of fault, which in turn may be derived from concepts
of state of mind and foreseeability of result.
A good illustration of the use of the deceit theory to impose
primary liability can be found in the accountant's liability field, in which
6 2 Id. at 80,520. The Commission's rejection of the necessity of actual knowledge
is ambivalent regarding support for a negligence standard for rule lOb-5. The opinion
did not require that the recipient have actual knowledge that the information was
non-public or that he have actual knowledge that it had been disclosed in a breach of
a fiduciary duty not to reveal it. The Commission instead used the term "reason to
know" and identified the circumstances that should be examined, including "the nature
and timing of the information, the manner in which it was obtained, the facts relating
to the informant, including his business or other relation to the recipient and to the
source of his information, and the recipient's sophistication and knowledge of related
facts." Id. at 80,520-21. Commissioner Smith's concurring opinion, id. at 80,523-24,
seems to make clear that the majority attempted to reject entirely the proposition
that a showing must be made that the recipient knew or had reason to know that the
information was disclosed in a breach of fiduciary duty not to reveal it. Instead, the
Commission acknowledged that there might be "responsibility" when the recipient
innocently came into possession of and used information he had reason to know was
intended to be confidential. Id. at 80,519 n.18.
In answer to the contention that "remote tippees" should not be responsible, the
Commission indicated that such tippees would also be responsible if sufficient proof
of the requisite knowledge were shown. Id. at 80,521.
63 Id. at 80,515.
64 The Restatement of Torts has been partially revised, so that portions of it
may be cited as Restatement (Second) of Torts, bearing a date of 1965. The pertinent
portions of the earlier revision bear a date of 1939. The section dealing with Chapter
22, entitled "Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Business Transactions" has not
yet been revised, but is contained in a so-called tentative draft of the Restatement.
Tentative Draft No. 10 (1964) of the Second Restatement.
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Fischer v. Kletz " is currently a leading case. That case was a class
action against the Yale Express System, Inc. (Yale), and other de-
fendants, including Yale's accountant, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
(PMM). The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs had been induced
to purchase securities of Yale through the use of misleading financial
statements. PMM had certified the financial statements contained in
the company's annual report for the year 1963. Subsequently PMM
discovered that the figures in the annual report were false and mislead-
ing. During a substantial period following discovery of the false
figures, Yale issued unaudited interim statements based in part upon the
certified financial figures for 1963. PMM did not disclose its findings
until May of 1965. The plaintiffs asserted that PMM was "liable in
damages for its failure to disclose not only that the certified financial
statements in the 1963 annual report contained false and misleading
figures but also that the interim statements issued by Yale were in-
accurate." 6
One of the three separate wrongs alleged in the complaint was that
PMM had failed to disclose to the public that its previously certified
financial reports were false and misleading. The court denied PMM's
motions to dismiss on this count.67  In so doing, it relied on common
law principles as enunciated in the Restatement of Torts. The court
concluded that an accountant's act of certification is similar in effect to
a representation made in a business transaction, since both supply
information naturally and justifiably relied upon by individuals for
decisional purposes.6" It concluded that facts could exist under which
PMM might have had a duty to disclose. As discussed in Fischer, this
liability is primary, since it involves breach of direct obligations to
the public.
65266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For discussions of accountants' liability,
see Hawldns, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 797 (1959); Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liabilit--How Far Do We
Go?, 36 ForD. L. REv. 19 (1967); Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for
Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGs LJ. 436 (1964); Solomon, Ultramares
Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DEPAuL L.
REv. 56 (1968) ; Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties Under Common
Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 137 (1967); Comment,
Accountant's Connon Law Liability to Third Persons for Misrepresentation, 57
CALiF. L. REv. 281 (1969); Comment, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Mis-
leading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1437 (1967) ; Comment, Accountants
Liability, 20 DRAE L. REv. 411 (1971); Comment, Auditor's Liability to Third
Parties, 17 LOyOLA L. REv. 354 (1970) ; Comment, Potential Liability of Accountants
to Third Parties for Negligence, 41 ST. JoHN's L. Rlv. 588 (1967); Comment,
Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of
Financial Statements, 44 WASH. U.L. REv. 139 (1968).
66266 F. Supp. at 183.
671d. at 188.
681d. at 186.
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The Fischer case also discussed the possibility of rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity, although it did not decide that issue.69 The intimations in the
Fischer case and others that direct duties imposed under common law
tort theory also arise under rule 10b-5 suggest that securities law
policies may develop by following common law doctrines. A few of
those doctrines merit closer examination.
The 1939 edition of the Restatement of Torts states in section 531
that:
the maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to
liability . . . only to those persons to whom it is made with
the intent to cause them to act in reliance upon it and to such
persons only for the pecuniary harm suffered by them by
relying upon it in the transaction or type of transaction in
which the maker intended to influence their conduct.
This statement represents a relatively limited view of liability because
it requires intentional misconduct and limits the kinds of transactions
in which liability could be asserted.
Current American Law Institute drafts in this area contain pro-
posed revised sections that expand liability. Proposed section 531 of
the Restatement of Torts reads as follows:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss
(a) to the persons or class of persons whom he intends
or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from
action in reliance upon the misrepresentation; and
(b) for pecuniary loss suffered by them through their
reliance in the type of transaction in which he in-
tends or has reason to expect their conduct to be
influenced. °
This section deals with so-called "fraudulent" misrepresentations, char-
acterized as including representations that are "consciously false." 7"
In addition to this liability based upon conscious misrepresenta-
tion, the Restatement drafters have embraced a theory of negligent
misrepresentations under revised section 552:
Section 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guid-
ance of Others
69 Id. at 194.
7O RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 531 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), discussed, 41 ALI
PROC EDINGS 490 (1964).
71 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, comment 8 at 98 (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964).
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(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or a transaction in which he has a pecuniary in-
terest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon such in-
formation, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability
stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information,
or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he
intends the information to influence, or knows that
the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to
give the information extends to loss suffered by any of the
class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any
of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.72
Although the revised section is poorly drafted, it could be read to create
liability to a large class of persons for an accountant who negligently
prepares a financial statement and transmits it to a corporation. The
class would be composed of those persons whom he knows will receive
the statements and rely upon them. In the typical case, the class could
include investors relying upon corporate financial statements contained
in annual reports and SEC filings.
These sections dealing with liability for misrepresentations empha-
size two factors-the state of mind of the person making the misrepre-
sentation and the likelihood that the information will be used by a
person who will suffer damage as a result of such use. The drafters
state their concern with expanded liability with two comments. Re-
garding intentional misrepresentation they state:
Where a misrepresentation is fraudulent, and results in pecu-
niary loss, the liability of the maker extends . . . to any of
the general class of persons whom he intends or has reason
to expect to act in reliance upon it, and to loss suffered by
them in any of the general type of transactions in which he
intends or should expect their conduct to be influenced.
73
In an early comment on the question of how far liability for negligent
misrepresentation should be extended, the Restatement drafters stated:
72 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966), discussed, 43 ALl
PROCEEDINGS 431 (1966).
73 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552, comment j at 27 (Tent.
Draft No. 12, 1966).
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The problem is to find language which will eliminate liability
to the very large class of persons whom almost any negligently
given information may foreseeably reach and influence, and
limit the liability, not to a particular plaintiff identified in ad-
vance, but to the comparatively small group whom the de-
fendant expects and intends to influence. 4
The latter comment seems to take the view that when a misrepre-
sentation is merely negligent the actor should be liable to a narrower
class of persons and for a lesser amount. This concern with the drastic
nature of an expanded remedy based upon negligence is demonstrated
in the decisions of common law courts that have dealt with liability of
accountants, who are the group most often involved in preparing state-
ments for the use of the public. State of mind and foreseeability have
influenced results in the three most frequently cited accountants cases,
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche7 5 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,76 and
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin.7 The Ultramares case was an action in
tort for damages suffered because of misrepresentations by accountants.
The accountants had prepared inaccurate financial statements knowing
that they would be used to secure credit. Plaintiffs loaned money in
reliance on the statements. Judge Cardozo contrasted liability for fraud
and that for negligence, stating that for fraud the accountants should
be liable to both their employer and to "creditors and investors to whom
the employer exhibited the certificate." 78 He denied liability to that
74 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 552 at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 11,
1965). The drafters' comment was included as a caveat to proposed revisions of
§ 552 when those revisions were considered by the American Law Institute in 1965.
Tentative Drafts No. 10 and 11 of the Restatement included the comment in order
to indicate lack of agreement on the language of proposed § 552. The drafters were
uncertain as to how far liability for negligent misrepresentation should extend. In
the 1966 American Law Institute proceedings prior to the adoption of Tentative Draft
No. 12 (which did not contain the comment) the Reporter (Dean Prosser) stated:
The Reporter's best guess . . . is that it is enough that there is a limited
class of persons-and by "limited" I would say probably not more than a
couple of dozen-whom the defendant is himself seeking for his own purposes
to reach, or whom he knows that a recipient of the information is going to
try to reach . . . . I think we need intent to reach a particular class of
people.
43 ALI PROCEEDINGs 415 (1966).
Comments made at the ALT Proceedings suggest caution in applying Restatement
principles to securities laws. Apparently the drafters did not consider the effect of
their work upon the securities laws. In response to a question regarding the effect
of proposed § 551 on rule 10b-5, Dean Prosser stated:
Anything under the SEC we regarded as statutory and simply left out of this
draft. This draft has no reference to that in any way, any more than it has
to decisions under various statutes. We are stating common law, and not
statutes.
42 AL PRO EEDINGs 380 (1965).
75 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
76278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
77284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
78255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
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same class for negligence, however, with the statement that it "may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." " In the State Street
Trust case, the New York Court of Appeals imposed liability on ac-
countants who heedlessly and recklessly prepared financial statements
upon which a lender relied.8"
In the Rusch Factors case the defendant accountant knew that his
certification was intended to induce reliance by potential lenders to a
Rhode Island corporation. Reviewing precedent the court stated,
"Privity of contract is clearly no defense in a fraud action," adding
that "an intentionally misrepresenting accountant is liable to all those
persons whom he should reasonably have foreseen would be injured by
his misrepresentation." "x It also equated heedless conduct with in-
tentional conduct, stating that "the same broad perimeter prevails if
the misrepresenter's conduct is heedless enough to permit an inference
of fraud." 82 Applying the foreseeability test, it stated that the ac-
countant need not have actual knowledge of the third person's reliance,
and that there are no limitations on the number of persons in the class.8 3
It supported this "broad rule of liability for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation" as follows:
First, liability should extend at least as far in fraud, an in-
tentional tort, as it does in negligence cases resulting in per-
sonal injury or property damage. Second, the risk of loss for
intentional wrongdoing should invariably be placed on the
wrongdoer who caused the harm, rather than on the innocent
victim of the harm. Finally, a broad rule of liability may
deter future misconduct.84
The court also suggested, without deciding, that liability for profes-
sional malpractice might be extended to a foreseeable class composed of
the "investing and lending public." 85 It stated:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the
weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice?
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread
by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass
the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who
can in turn pass the cost on to the entire consuming public?
79 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
80 278 N.Y. at 112, 121, 15 N.E.2d at 419, 423.




85 Id. at 91.
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Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary
techniques of the accounting profession? "
Despite this apparent willingness to extend the theory, the court
indicated that the plaintiff was a single party whose reliance was actu-
ally foreseen by the defendant. It held that "an accountant should be
liable in negligence for careless financial misrepresentations relied upon
by actually foreseen and limited classes of persons." "
These common law doctrines of foreseeability and state of mind
undoubtedly will influence the development of securities law liabilities,
particularly under rule 10b-5. Their applicability may be particularly
important in situations in which special duties are owed. In Fischer v.
Kletg, 8 the court concentrated its analysis upon direct breach of a duty
by the defendant accountants. Attention to separate duties owed by
professionals such as accountants and brokers emphasizes that in a
complicated case involving numerous defendants liability may be im-
posed without resort to secondary liability theories if the existence of an
independent duty to the public by virtue of special professional status
can be shown. Additionally, the common law technique of measuring
liability based upon defendant's state of mind, including foreseeability,
is one that should prove useful not only in analyzing direct liability
cases 80 but also in deciding which defendants should be liable under
secondary theories.
D. Privity of Contract
Although questions regarding state of mind and foreseeability
taken alone raise important questions for primary defendants, these
questions become increasingly important when considered in the context
of the current tendency toward elimination of privity of contract in
securities law cases. Under developing doctrines both primary and
secondary defendants in securities law fraud cases may find themselves
liable to many more persons than those with whom they have had
dealings. Until about 1962, the prevailing view under rule 10b-5 was
that privity of contract was required between an injured plaintiff and a
defendant. The most widely quoted statement appeared in Joseph v.
Farns worth Radio & Television Corp.: 90
A semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of
the security in connection with which the improper act, prac-
8 6 Id.
87 Id. at 93.
88 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
89 See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privily and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968).
90 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aft'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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tice or course of business was invoked seems to be requisite.
91
Subsequently, however, numerous courts have held that no privity re-
quirement exists. One of the earliest of these cases was Cochran v.
Channing Corp.," in which the plaintiffs in a class action alleged that
the corporate insiders had omitted the company's dividend for the
purpose of causing the price to decline so that they could purchase shares
on the open market. The plaintiffs failed to allege that they had sold
their stock to the insider purchasers. 3 The court denied a motion to
dismiss, stating, "[T]he fact that there is no privity of contract does
not amount to a fatal defect of proof." "' Other courts have followed
the lead of the Cochran court and have held that privity of contract is
not a required element.9
The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation illustrates problems currently
being raised by developing doctrines that the plaintiff need not show a
contractual relationship with the defendant. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,96 the Tenth Circuit affirmed imposition of liability upon
Texas Gulf Sulphur for a misleading press release, stating that "the
common law requirement of privity has all but vanished from 10b-5
proceedings." 97 The court allowed recovery on behalf of three plain-
tiffs, even though the company had not engaged in any securities
transactions."'
The elimination or reduction of the element of privity as a factor
in determining liability is, of course, an important one for secondary
91 Id. at 706.
92211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
931d.
94Id. at 245.
95 See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp.
14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd & remanded on other grounds sub norn. Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff may maintain
action against original sellers of bonds although he had not purchased directly from
them); Freed v. Szabo Food Serv. Inc., [1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (plaintiffs have claim against misrepresenting cor-
poration even though the corporation did not engage in a securities transaction);
Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (purchasers
may maintain action based upon misleading reports filed with the SEC although
defendants had not traded: "[I]f 'a semblance of privity' means 'privity' (like 'a
little bit pregnant'), I reject it") ; Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1963)
(class actions by purchasers based upon misleading financial statements can be
maintained, since "[tlhere is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities
by insiders or by the corporation itself").
96 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'g Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309
F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3399 (1972).
97 446 F2d at 101.
98 Id. For discussions of privity in terms of the "in connection with" require-
ment, see Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Financial Indus. Fund v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEc. L. REP.
ff 93,004 (D. Colo. 1971).
1972]
620 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
defendants. Nevertheless, in order for liability to exist, someone must
have engaged in activity that violates the rule. Abolition of the privity
requirement makes the potential damage for a secondary defendant
greater, and emphasizes that careful attention should be given to
identification of the elements required for secondary liability.
E. Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting
1. Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting
Defined and Distinguished
As noted earlier, tort theory has been a fertile source of doctrine
under rule lOb-5 and other securities laws. The general statement of
secondary liability appearing in section 876 of the Restatement of
Torts 9 has been seized upon by some courts as providing a source of
liability for secondary defendants. That section contains the following
language:
876. Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, a person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the
conditions under which the act is done or intending
the consequences which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
of duty and gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accom-
plishing a tortious result and his own conduct, sep-
arately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to
the third person."'
The Restatement view has been advanced in Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Insurance Co.,' which is to date the most important secu-
rities law case dealing with secondary liability. That case involved a
class action by purchasers who had bought stock of Midwestern United
Life Insurance Company from Michael Dobich and Dobich Securities
Corporation but who had failed to receive delivery of their stock.
Dobich had been dealing fraudulently with his customers' money in
violation of the securities laws. The plaintiff claimed that Midwestern
9 9 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
1o Id.
101 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp.
702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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should be liable because it had knowingly assisted Dobich in his fraud.
The trial court relied in part upon tort theories, quoting section 876 of
the Restatement of Torts "02 in its first decision, which denied defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of action.
10 3
Although not relying directly on section 876 in its decision on the
merits, the court stated that the general concept of aiding and abetting
"has been formulated in a most helpful manner in the Restatement of
Torts § 876." 104
Since section 876 of the Restatement of Torts deals primarily with
liability for physical harm rather than liability in the business or
economic setting, it should be relied upon with caution in invoking
securities law liability. Nevertheless, the concepts introduced may be
useful. Subsection (a) of section 876 places secondary liability upon
a person who orders or induces tortious conduct knowing of the con-
ditions under which the act is done or intending the consequences that
ensue. This section parallels the agency principles examined earlier in
this Article and encompasses a type of primary liability.
Clause (b) accords most clearly with the aiding and abetting
theory of secondary liability. According to the Restatement comment,
liability requires both that the act is known to be tortious and that the
encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the re-
sulting tort.1 5
Clause (c) deals with a situation in which the assistance is sub-
stantial, but the person engaging in the activity does not know that the
act of the primary participant is tortious. The comment to Clause (c)
states the following:
Where a person personally participates in causing a par-
ticular result in accordance with an agreement with another,
he is responsible for the result of the united effort if his act,
considered by itself, constitutes a breach of duty and is a sub-
stantial factor in causing the result, irrespective of his knowl-
edge that his act or the act of the other is tortious.'0 6
This section does not specify the nature of the duty owed by the
secondary participant. It does, however, require that the participation
be "in accordance with an agreement" with the primary tortfeasor. The
comments to this section relate only to minor physical harms."0 7  The
1
0
2 RSTATEMXT OF ToRTs § 876 (1939).
103 259 F. Supp. at 680.
104 286 F. Supp. at 708.
lo5 RESTATEM-NT OF TORTS § 876, comment b at 436.
106 Id., comment c at 439.
107 Id. Each of the illustrations relates to physical activities and recites a situa-
tion in which the secondary participant is not liable.
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section offers little helpful analysis and properly should be rejected as
an independent source of liability under the securities laws.
Although the lower court in the Brennan case utilized tort prin-
ciples, it also analyzed the securities law doctrine of aiding and abetting,
rejecting a claim that Congress had by implication excluded aiding and
abetting activities from coverage by the securities laws.1"8 It concluded
that since the 1934 Act was broad and remedial it "should not easily
be rendered impotent to deal with new and unique situations within the
scope of the evils intended to be eliminated." ' It stated:
In the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary,
the statute must be flexibly applied so as to implement its
policies and purposes. In this regard, it cannot be said that
civil liability for damages, so well established under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, may never under any circum-
stances be imposed upon persons who do no more than aid
and abet a violation of Section 10 (b) and Rule l0b-5."1°
Before coming to this conclusion the district court discussed the dis-
closure obligations of corporations and concluded that since disclosure
was a protection for investors, the securities law should be directed
toward that end. It stated:
The effect on an investor of an issuer corporation's failure to
disclose improper activities of a brokerage firm dealing heavily
in the issuer's stock, where the broker's activities create an
appreciable risk of loss to that investor, may be just as danger-
ous and equally as damaging as a failure by the issuer to dis-
close information of its own improper activities affecting the
value of its stock. The loss to the investor may well be the
same.
111
The Seventh Circuit approved the latter quoted language.
112
It might be urged that the Seventh Circuit's approval of the dis-
trict court's statement amounts to an implied statement that an affirma-
tive disclosure obligation with regard to corporate activities exists and
that such an affirmative disclosure obligation should be extended to
include the corporation's knowledge of improper activities affecting its
own stock. To construe the Brennan decision as imposing an affirma-
tive obligation would amount to a remarkable advance in the imposition
of direct liability upon a corporation. Thus far, no case has held that
108 259 F. Supp. at 678.
109 Id. at 680.
110 Id. at 680-81.
111 Id. at 680.
112 417 F.2d at 155.
[Vol.120:597
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
an affirmative obligation to disclose inside information exists in the
absence of trading or other factors. The Brennan case need not be
read as imposing such an obligation."' 3 It is better considered as a
landmark case establishing that liability may be imposed upon a defend-
ant who himself was not a primary participant in a securities law fraud,
but who assisted or conspired with the primary participant.
In its Brennan decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that a secondary
defendant may be liable for giving active and knowing assistance to a
third party engaged in fraudulent activities violating the securities
laws. It reached that conclusion only after acknowledging the existence
of an independent securities law violation. In establishing liability for
giving knowing assistance to that violation the court left many questions
unanswered. Those questions include the following:
(1) To what extent must the secondary defendant's knowledge of the
primary defendant's activities be shown?
(2) To what extent must the secondary defendant's knowledge of the
illegality of those activities be shown?
(3) What is the nature of the agreement or assistance required?
113 Despite the absence of such an affirmative disclosure obligation, the kinds,
types, and numbers of factors that will give rise to such an obligation seem to be
increasing. For instance, an obligation may exist to correct a prior incorrect state-
ment, Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); there may be a con-
tinuing obligation to disclose events that make prior statements untrue, SEC v.
Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The stock ex-
changes have implemented so-called timely disclosure practices. For instance, the
New York Stock Exchange Company Manual states:
A corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange is
expected to release quickly to the public any news or information which
might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for securities.
A corporation should also act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which
result in unusual market activity or price variations.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCIANGE CoiiPANY MANUAL A-18 (1968). Additionally, in
October 1970 the SEC announced that:
[A company] has an obligation to make full and prompt announcements of
material facts regarding the company's financial condition.
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,915, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970). It continued by stating the following:
Not only must material facts affecting the company's operations be
reported; they must also be reported promptly. Corporate releases which
disclose personnel changes, the receipt of new contracts, orders and other
favorable developments but do not even suggest existing adverse corporate
developments do not serve the public needs and may violate the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ....
The policy of prompt corporate disclosure of material business events is
embodied in the rules and directives of the major exchanges. It should be
noted that unless adequate and accurate information is available, a company
may not be able to purchase its own securities or make acquisitions using its
securities, and its insiders may not be able to trade its securities without
running a serious risk of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
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Discussion of these questions and others requires consideration of the
historical background of aiding and abetting liability, as well as secu-
rities law policies.
In the securities law field, aiding and abetting doctrines have been
utilized frequently by the SEC in its disciplinary proceedings. For
instance, in SEC v. Barraco,"4 the Commission brought suit against
Barraco seeking injunctive relief for violation of net capital require-
ments ... and bookkeeping rules."6 The suit also sought an injunction
against the officers of the corporation, both directly and as aiders and
abettors. The court dealt with the contention that the rules upon which
the Commission was proceeding applied only to brokers and dealers
and not to their officers."' Concerning its inherent powers to issue
injunctions against corporate officers," s it concluded:
It could hardly make any difference in respect to the
court's inherent power to deal with contributors what term or
designation might be employed in relation to them. Here the
Commission, apparently as a matter of convenience and uni-
formity for purpose of its complaints and decrees, has chosen
to use the term "aiders and abettors" in general designation
of any such persons as have contributingly played a part in the
doing or commission of an enjoinable act by another. 19
The Barraco case illustrates the SEC's frequent use of the phrase "aider
and abettor" in Commission actions in order to ensure that sanctions can
be broadly imposed. Since the term has been limited primarily to use
in SEC disciplinary and injunctive proceedings, the SEC's broad char-
acterization of the doctrine has shed little light on the use of aiding and
abetting theories in private damage actions. In another recent case in-
volving a broker-dealer and other defendants, SEC v. National Bankers
Life Insurance Co.,"2 ' the court criticized the Commission's broad use
114438 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1971).
115 1934 Act § 15(c) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (3) (1970) ; SEC Reg. 15c3-1, 17
C.F.R. §240.156-1 (1971).
1161934 Act §17(a), 15 U.S.C. §78q(a) (1970); SEC Reg. 17a-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17a-3 (1971).
117 438 F.2d at 98.
118 It characterized the grant of injunctive authority under § 21(e) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. §78u(e) (1970), as granting power to the Commission to seek the
traditional general power of a court of equity to issue injunctions. It stated the
following:
That power, as we have discussed, extends to making enjoinder personally of
any or all of those who have played a material part in the commission of an
enjoinable act, contributors as well as principals, where the court deems the
enjoinder of a contributor necessary to prevent a recurrence of the act.
438 F.2d at 99.
110 Id.
120 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
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of the term. After noting that "[a]iding and abetting in the context of
this case is an illusive concept," 121 the court stated:
It is always possible in a complex law suit that a party may
become unable to see the forest for the trees. That appears to
be the situation in the instant case with the SEC. The SEC
has brought suit against a number of defendants that allegedly
committed a wide variety of acts. The SEC has sought to
paint them all with the same broad brush-claiming that the
various activities have made each defendant part of a con-
spiracy to sell unregistered stock and part of a scheme to
defraud. Because of this alleged combined activity, the SEC
sought to hold them all jointly liable. In so doing, the SEC,
however, failed to distinguish one defendant from the other
and failed to properly delineate individual violations. 2
Few Securities and Exchange Commission opinions involving the
aiding and abetting doctrine have been appealed and only a few non-
criminal cases have dealt with either an aiding and abetting or a con-
spiracy claim against secondary defendants.' Sufficient cases exist,
however, involving claims of either conspiracy or aiding and abetting 124
121 Id. at 195.
12 2 1d. at 197.
12 3 Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966)
(motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), aff'd,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), is by far the most
important case in this series.
124Those cases are the following:
1. Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944).
2. In re Matter of Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461 (1946).
3. Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
4. Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104
(W.D. Ark. 1949).
5. Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
6. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
7. H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
8. In re Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443 (1963).
9. Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
10. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1964).
11. United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964).
12. SEC v. J.P. Howell & Co., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1962),
aff'd, 330 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1964).
13. Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
14. Bronner v. Goldman, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933
(1966).
15. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
Ind. 1968).
16. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
17. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
18. Butterman v. Walston & Co., Inc., 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
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to permit an examination of the theories and an attempt to clarify the
requisites for liability under each.
In its early application of aiding and abetting and conspiracy doc-
trines as well as in its later approaches the SEC has tended to rely upon
criminal law concepts. 2 These criminal law concepts offer a good
starting point in interpreting substantive doctrines relating to con-
spiracy and aiding and abetting.'- 6 This background may be particu-
19. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
20. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
nodified and aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
21. Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
22. Wyndham Associates v. Bintliff, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
Swc. LAW REP. 92,016 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968).
23. Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. LAW REP,. 1192,196 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 402 F.2d 935 (2d
Cir. 1968).
24. Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969).
25. Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
26. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
27. Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969).
28. Wood v. Wood, 312 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
29. Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 958 (1970).
30. SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
31. SEC v. Barraco, 438 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1971).
32. Stead v. SEC, 444 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct.
739 (1972).
33. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
34. SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.),
aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
For general discussion of these doctrines, see 2 A. BROmBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD § 8.5(515) (1971).
125 E.g., In re Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461, 466 & n.11 (1946).
126 Nevertheless, it seems most likely that the source of conspiracy or aiding and
abetting theories as a method of imposing liability upon secondary defendants in
securities law situations will be the Securities Acts rather than federal laws relating
generally to conspiracy or aiding and abetting, which read:
Conspiracy . . .
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970);
Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly per-
formed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. §2 (1970). It seems unlikely that either section of the United States Code
will be used directly to imply a private right of action. See Bryant v. Donnell,
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larly helpful in analyzing the key elements identified above: the exist-
ence of the independent securities law violation, knowledge of that
violation and its illegality, and the nature of the agreement or assistance
rendered by the secondary defendant.
One criminal law definition of aiding and abetting is the following:
Whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or pro-
cures the commission of a crime is punishable as a principal.
In order to aid or abet the commission of a crime a person
must associate himself with the criminal venture, participate
in it, and try to make it succeed.' 7
Similarly a definition of conspiracy under criminal law has been stated
as follows:
A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to ac-
complish an unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose by unlaw-
ful means. 28
The distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting was stated
in Pinkerton v. United States,'29 a case involving a charge that two
brothers had violated the Internal Revenue Code. In his dissent,
Justice Rutledge distinguished substantive offenses, aiding and abetting,
and conspiracy:
The gist of conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding, abet-
ting or counseling is in consciously advising or assisting
another to commit particular offenses, and thus becoming
a party to them; that of substantive crime, going a step be-
yond mere aiding, abetting, counseling to completion of the
offense.' o
Another statement of the difference appears in Nye & Nissen v. United
States.'3' In holding that a defendant against whom a conspiracy
charge could not be established had aided and abetted the making of
misrepresentations in invoices presented to the War Shipping Admin-
istration, the court stated:
In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is neces-
sary that a defendant "in some sort associate himself with
the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he
239 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). This does not mean that criminal prosecution
for aiding and abetting and conspiracy would not be available in an appropriate
securities law case. See Brenner, Selected Jury Instruction Forms in an SEC
Criminal Case, 41 F.R.D. 93, 119-29 (1967).
127 Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference Committee on jury Instructions, Manual
on Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 523, 544 (1963).
128 Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference Committee on Jury Instructions, Manual
on Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 36 F.R.D. 457, 503 (1965).
129328 U.S. 640 (1946).
130 Id. at 649.
'3'336 U.S. 613 (1949).
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wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed." 132
2. Existence of the Independent Wrong
Whether the liability of the secondary defendant is based upon con-
spiracy or aiding and abetting, an independent illegal act or venture
must exist to which he can attach himself either by agreement or by
action. If his own act is unlawful, he becomes the primary violator of
the securities law.1 3 Courts that have imposed liability, administrative
sanctions, or criminal penalties upon secondary defendants in securities
law cases often do not emphasize the independent wrong requirement,
because in most such cases the wrong is easily established. Illustrative
cases appear below.
In the leading case in the aider and abettor field, Brenuzn v. Mid-
western United Life Insurance Co., 3' Michael Dobich and Dobich
Securities Corporation were found by the trial court to have been vio-
lating the securities laws by dealing in a fraudulent manner with custo-
mers' money.'35 Dobich accomplished his fraud by accepting orders
and payments for stock of Midwestern United Life Insurance Company
and using his customers' payments to speculate on the commodities
market.3 6 Liability was imposed upon Midwestern on the grounds
that it knew that Dobich was violating the securities laws and that it
had actively aided and abetted him."'
In an earlier case, Pettit v. American Stock achange,13 8 the
trustees in bankruptcy of Swan-Finch Corporation alleged that the
corporation was injured when Swan-Finch stock was issued to its con-
trolling stockholder, Lowell Birrell, without adequate consideration,
and subsequently was resold to the public through manipulative activi-
ties joined in by two specialists on the American Stock Exchange. The
trustees sued the Exchange, a brokerage firm, and a Swiss bank. The
court acknowledged the existence of two fraudulent schemes, the first
of which was issuance of shares to Birrell without adequate consider-
132 Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938)).
'33 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah
1970), aff'd in part sub norn. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
'34 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp.
702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
135 417 F.2d at 149.
136 Another aspect of this case appears in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
137 The difference between active and passive conduct will be discussed at notes
249-53 infra & accompanying text.
1'8 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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ation and the second of which was sale of these shares to the public
without registration, in a rigged market.'39 It characterized the as-
sistance of the various defendants in connection with the illegal distri-
bution of Swan-Finch stock as follows:
[T]he trustees claim that defendant Exchange and its officers
aided, abetted, and assisted the illegal distribution of Swan-
Finch stock by failing to take necessary disciplinary action
against abusive conduct and practices of which they knew or
should have known. Defendant Ira Haupt & Co. is accused
of having assisted, aided, and abetted the Birrell conspiracy
by permitting the Res to open and maintain dummy accounts.
The Swiss Bank defendants are accused of similar conduct
with respect to their banking facilities, and also of having
assisted the concealment of the true identity of traders in
Swan-Finch stock, and having aided the sale and delivery of
unregistered Swan-Finch stock. 4 '
In SEC v. North American Research and Development Corp.,4'
three defendants inaugurated a scheme to buy a publicly owned corpo-
rate shell, to dress up that shell with assets that could be represented
as having enormous potential value, to funnel the shares into cooperat-
ing brokerage houses in Canada, and to tout the stock for sale in
America, all for the purpose of selling worthless shares to Americans
at great profit. The SEC request for a preliminary injunction alleged
that the three primary defendants had violated the Securities Acts by
failing to register the securities and by making misrepresentations in
connection with their distribution. The lower court granted a pre-
liminary injunction against the three primary defendants, but denied a
motion for a preliminary injunction against other defendants. In up-
holding the preliminary injunction against the three primary defendants
and reversing denial of the motion for preliminary injunction against
other defendants, the Second Circuit treated the failure to register sale
of the securities as an obvious violation of the 1933 Act 142 and the mis-
representations in regard to sale of the securities as obvious violations
of Sections 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. It thus treated the
independent wrongs as clearly established.
Similarly, in Wessel v. Buhler.48 the court dealt with a claim that
misrepresentations regarding financial figures had been made in three
prospectuses distributed by Rocky Mountain Chemical Corporation
139 Id. at 25-26.
140 Id. at 28.
141 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g in. part 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1421933 Act §5, 15 U.S.C. §77e (1970).
143 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
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(RMC). The plaintiff claimed that an accountant, Jordan, who had
submitted financial statements to RMC should be liable for damages
caused when these statements were incorporated into prospectuses used
to sell stock. 4 In one branch of its ruling, the court analyzed an
aiding and abetting claim against Jordan by assuming that a mis-
leading prospectus had been issued in violation of the securities laws
and then reached the merits of and rejected an aiding and abetting claim
against Jordan.' 45
The above cases demonstrate the largely unarticulated premise
that an independent wrong must exist before aiding and abetting or
conspiracy liability can be imposed. Even though the independent
wrong is easy to establish in most aiding and abetting and conspiracy
cases, exact identification of the wrong is essential in order to determine
which persons should be subject to liability for giving knowing assist-
ance to or agreeing with the primary participants in the wrongdoing.
3. The Knowledge Requirement
Once the independent wrong has been established, aiding and abet-
ting liability will depend upon a showing that the defendant knew of
the wrong and gave assistance to the wrongdoer. Conspiracy liability
will require such knowledge plus an agreement with the wrongdoer.
The existence and nature of a knowledge requirement may become
crucial to determining which parties bear liability. As aiding and abet-
ting and conspiracy liabilities in the securities field develop, careful con-
sideration of knowledge requirements is essential in order to achieve
sound and balanced policy. For instance, in the Westec litigation it
appears that numerous banks loaned money to Westec insiders who in
turn used those funds to manipulate the market in Westec stock.' 46 If
all that is required in order to impose liability for aiding and abetting
is that illegal activity under the securities laws exists and that a sec-
ondary defendant, such as a bank, gave aid to that illegal activity, the
act of loaning funds to the market manipulator would clearly fall within
that category and would expose the bank to liability for aiding and
abetting. Imposition of such liability upon banks would virtually make
them insurers regarding the conduct of insiders to whom they loan
money. If it is assumed that an illegal scheme existed and that the
bank's loan or other activity provided assistance to that scheme, some
144 The Wessel case is discussed at text accompanying notes 201-02 infra in
connection with attempts to place liability upon Jordan as a direct participant in the
production of misleading prospectuses.
'45 437 F.2d at 283.
146 See Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970), and cases cited
note 5 supra.
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remaining distinguishing factor must be found in order to prevent such
automatic liability. The bank's knowledge of the illegal scheme at the
time it loaned the money or agreed to loan the money provides that
additional factor. Knowledge of wrongful purpose thus becomes a
crucial element in aiding and abetting or conspiracy cases.
The existence of a knowledge requirement in order to impose
such liability should be distinguished from the question whether scienter
is a necessary element to establish liability for the primary participant.
The question whether scienter is a required element under rule lOb-5,
the primary federal regulation dealing with securities law fraud, must
be regarded as open at this time. 47  The circuit courts are either split
or in confusion regarding the existence of a scienter element. The Ninth
Circuit has held that scienter is not a required element in a rule lOb-5
action, although the cases asserting this proposition have involved face-
to-face rather than market transactions.14 Similarly the Eighth Circuit
has stated that a negligence standard will suffice.' 49 The Tenth Circuit
has stated that scienter has not been abolished as a factor in a private
action under rule lOb-5."' Although the Second Circuit has frequently
been cited for the proposition that a private right of action under rule
lOb-5 exists only when the element of scienter is present,' 5, its decision
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' 2 has introduced doubt regarding
the existence of a scienter requirement in that circuit." 3 Other circuits
147 Policy considerations regarding state of mind are discussed in Ruder, Texas
Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase
and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968). Other discussions of the scienter
problem can be found in Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to
Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1206 (1970) ;
Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1057 (1969) ; Comment, Scienter
in Private Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Gmo. L.J. 1108 (1969) ; Comment,
Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHE. L. REV. 824 (1965);
Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YA=E LJ. 658 (1965).
148See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F2d
270 (9th Cir. 1961).
149Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970) ; City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 905 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968).
150 It did so in a case in which it selected as its standard that contained in
12(2) of the 1933 Act, placing the burden upon the defendant to sustain an affirma-
tive defense "that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known" that a misrepresentation or omission existed. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102, 104 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971),
referring to Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
151 In reliance upon Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
152 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
153 See Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fa. SEc. L. REP. 192,881 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), reporting that "the extent to which
traditional scienter requirements of the common law must be pled and proved in a
private damage claim under 10b and X-10b-5 is an open question in this circuit."
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have not reached clear positions regarding scienter. 54 Few have dis-
cussed the knowledge element in the aiding and abetting setting.
Although elimination of a scienter requirement in order to estab-
lish violation by the primary participant may be urged upon the grounds
that maximum protection of investors will be provided by requiring
exercise of care when engaging in activities that might injure others,
different considerations enter into eliminating scienter as an element of
aiding and abetting or conspiracy and substituting a duty of inquiry or
a "should have known" standard.'55 In most cases, the alleged aider
and abettor (or conspirator) will merely be engaging in customary
business activities, such as loaning money, managing a corporation,
preparing financial statements, distributing press releases, completing
brokerage transactions, or giving legal advice. If each of these parties
Id. at 90,296. However, in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d
Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit reaffirmed its scienter requirement in the brokerage
context.
154 Fourth Circuit: Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1037 (1970), aff'g in part & rev'g in part 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968) ;
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971) ; Batchelor v. Legg
& Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. If[ 93,119, 93,120 (D. Md.
1971); Fifth Circuit: Hendricks v. Flato Realty Invs., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,290 (S.D. Tex. 1968); see Investors Management Co.,
SEC Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 2967, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,163 (1971); Sixth Circuit: Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,027 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Seventh Circuit:
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) ; SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966) ;
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'g 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.
Wis. 1962).
155 Most securities law aiding and abetting or conspiracy cases have not discussed
the knowledge point because knowledge was not in question. In Fry v. Schumaker,
83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947), the conspiring brokers knew their letter was part
of a scheme to defraud; in Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,
85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949), Merrill, Lynch, which assisted another broker in
violating the securities laws, knew that the broker was misusing his account with
Merrill, Lynch; in Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the defendants
were alleged to be engaged in a common plan or concert of action which was char-
acterized as a conspiracy; in SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), the defendant knew that the securities in question would be sold without
registration; in H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the
defendant accountants knowingly prepared false financial statements with an intent to
induce the plaintiff to enter into a merger; in Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217
F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the trustees alleged that the bank, the brokerage firm,
and the exchange knowingly participated in supporting defendants' illegal activities;
in Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), at the time each insider defendant
offered to buy the plaintiffs' shares he knew of a proposed public and private offering
at a higher price; in Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Minn. 1968), knowing assistance in a fraudulent scheme was alleged; in Carroll v.
First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970),
the bank was alleged to have given active and knowing assistance to the primary
wrongdoers; in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135 (7th Cir. 1969), the defendant was alleged to have knowingly aided, abetted,
and assisted a bankrupt in using fraudulently converted property. In Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970), the court did not discuss whether knowledge was a requirement.
Instead, it emphasized its duty to determine whether the trial judge's decision that
Midwestern officials knew Dobich was misusing his customers' money could be
sustained. Id. at 151.
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will be required to investigate the ultimate activities of the party whom
he is assisting, a burden may be imposed upon business activities that
is too great. Although such a duty might contribute to the protection
of investors by creating another level of private investigators, creation
of such a duty through use of aiding and abetting or conspiracy con-
cepts should take place only through the sound foundations of judicial
precedent in analogous fields or express statutory language.
The essential point is that imposition of a duty to investigate under
the guise of a "should have known" standard in essence would amount
to eliminating scienter as a necessary element in imposing aiding and
abetting liability and the substitution of a negligence standard. The
existence of a scienter standard rather than a negligence standard seems
clear in criminal cases dealing with conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
In conspiracy there must be an intent to do wrong. As one court put it:
[I]t must appear that the defendant knew of the illegal el-
ement involved in that which the combination was intended to
accomplish. . . . To constitute the criminal intent necessary
to establish a conspiracy there must be both knowledge of the
existence of the law and knowledge of its actual or intended
violation.'5 6
Knowledge of wrongful purpose is also a necessary element in
criminal law aiding and abetting cases. In a still cited California forgery
case, the court held invalid an instruction that would have allowed con-
viction for aiding or abetting. It stated:
A person may aid in the commission of an offense by doing
innocently some act essential to its accomplishment, and this is
especially true in regard to the crime of forgery, for he may
pass the forged instrument without knowing that it is forged.
The word "aid" does not imply guilty knowledge or felonious
intent, whereas the definition of the word "abet" includes
knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the perpetrator and
counsel and encouragement in the crime.'
1.56 Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 135, 194 N.E. 905, 910 (1935),
quoted in W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 9.02 (7th ed., M. Barnes ed.
1967).
157People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 492, 55 P. 581, 584 (1898) ; see People v. Etie,
119 Cal. App. 2d 23, 258 P.2d 1069 (1953) ; State v. Corcoran, 7 Idaho 220, 61 P.
1034 (900); State v. Allen, 34 Mont. 403, 87 P. 177 (1906). Similar concepts
appear in a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with conspiracy and aiding and
abetting: United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1940) (citations omitted):
The gist of the offense of conspiracy . . . is agreement among the con-
spirators to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the
conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy. . . . Those having no
knowledge of the conspiracy are not conspirators . . . and one who without
more furnishes supplies to an illicit distiller is not guilty of conspiracy even
though his sale may have furthered the object of a conspiracy to which the
distiller was a party but of which the supplier had no knowledge.
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A statement that the actor must not only know what the primary
participants plan, but that he must have an awareness of the illegality
of their proposed acts appears in a narcotics case holding that the jury
must find that "the defendants charged with conspiracy had knowledge
of the general illicit purposes of importation, transportation, or adultera-
tion." 1,8 In dismissing a civil case alleging fraudulent conduct under
rule 10b-5, a district court judge recently stated: "9
"Conspiracy involves an element of scienter." . . Such
guilty knowledge of or participation in a concerted, pre-
arranged unlawful plan has not been demonstrated. Nor is
one party's domination of persons and corporations a suffi-
cient predicate for finding a conspiracy existed. 6 °
Agreement that a knowledge requirement exists and that the
knowledge must include knowledge of the illegality of the act in ques-
tion does not complete the knowledge analysis. Given the difficulty of
probing a man's mind, courts have confronted knowledge requirements
in several ways.
In cases in which courts desire to impose liability but are unsure
regarding their ability to justify results on a factual basis, they may
resort to discussion of knowledge in terms of recklessness. Thus in
Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,' 61 the court analyzed the various
subsections of rule 10b-5, compared them to the provisions of section
12(2) of the 1933 Act,1 62 and concluded that scienter was a necessary
element in a rule 10b-5 action. Nevertheless, it added that the scienter
requirement could be satisfied by a showing of recklessness:
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) (dealing with sale of
narcotics) (footnote omitted) :
This intent, when given effect by overt act, is the gist of conspiracy. While
it is not identical with mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful
action, it is not unrelated to such knowledge. Without the knowledge, the
intent cannot exist. United States v. Falcone, supra. Furthermore, to estab-
lish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal. Ibid.
This, because charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference
upon inference, thus fashioning what, in that case, was called a dragnet to
draw in all substantive crimes.
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949):
Aiding and abetting has a broader application [than conspiracy]. It makes a
defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether
or not there is a conspiracy.
158 United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 959 (1963) (emphasis in original).
159 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FMD. SEC.
L. Rn'. 1192,575 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1f 93,342 (7th Cir. 1972).
160 Id. at 98,623.
161 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
162 Id. at 762-72.
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We do not understand, however, that a knowing or in-
tentional violation of Rule 10b-5 (2) must necessarily involve
actual knowledge. Even in common-law fraud actions in
Colorado, for example, it is clear that a representation made
in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity is legally equivalent
to a representation made with actual knowledge of its
falsity.163
A similar result was reached in a recent SEC action in which the Second
Circuit applied a recklessness standard to conduct which could be de-
scribed either as primary participation or aiding and abetting.16
The Trussel court also approached the knowledge requirement by
indicating that knowledge could be proved by inference. It found that
"[flrom the totality of events a scheme to defraud may be deduced." 15
Similarly, in the Brennan case the Seventh Circuit majority opinion
stated :
Our function is to ascertain, after considering the record in its
entirety, whether the inferences drawn by the trial judge have
a sufficient evidentiary basis so that it can be said they are
reasonable, that is, could have been arrived at by logical de-
duction."6'
Often a court or jury will not have direct evidence regarding
knowledge and will be required to reach a conclusion through in-
ference. 167  In an aider and abettor case not in the securities field,
163 Id. at 772.
164 SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 72, 80, 81 (2d
Cir. 1970). In one phase of the case the court used aiding and abetting language,
but did not discuss a scienter requirement. In another phase of the case the court
used recklessness language, but did not indicate that it was employing aiding and
abetting concepts.
165 228 F. Supp. at 772.
166 417 F.2d at 149. The dissenting judge objected to the result on the grounds
that the trial judge's decision "rests on a compounding of wholly unjustified inferences
and upon pure speculation." Id. at 156. He stated "there is simply nothing to suggest
more than a highly speculative possibility that defendant could have any knowledge
of any fraud, much less that it engaged in any intentional aiding or abetting thereof."
Id.
167 The following are illustrative statements. Peterson v. Cruickshank, 144 Cal.
App. 2d 148, 163, 300 P.2d 915, 925 (1956) :
In fact, in the absence of a confession by one of the conspirators, it is usually
very difficult to secure direct evidence of a conspiracy, so that in the usual
case the ultimate fact of a conspiracy must be determined from those infer-
ences naturally and properly to be drawn from those matters directly proved.
Galatas v. United States, 80 F.2d 15, 22 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 711
(1936) :
Conspiracy is rarely susceptible of direct and positive proof, but it may
be proven by circumstantial evidence.
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 180, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1951),
rev'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1956), vacated & remanded, 352 U.S.
992 (1957) :
The essence of conspiracy, in the absence of actual agreement, is scienter by
the conspirators: a mutual awareness of each other's activities, a contemplated
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Costello v. Uuited States,6' the Eighth Circuit compared the proof
problem to that in cases involving receipt of stolen goods:
The requisite guilty knowledge need not be actual, direct,
positive, or absolute, but may be constructive, implied, or
circumstantial. It is not essential to a conviction that the
requisite guilty knowledge that the goods were stolen should
be actual, direct or positive and absolute, such, for instance,
as knowledge acquired by having personally witnessed or
observed the theft, or by information of the theft from persons
who had personal knowledge, such as eye witnesses or the
person from whom the goods were received; the requisite
knowledge may be circumstantial or deductive, and construc-
tive or implied knowledge through notice of facts and circum-
stances from which guilty knowledge may be fairly inferred
satisfies the requirements as to knowledge. 69
Application of the knowledge requirement in securities law con-
spiracy or aiding and abetting cases could be confused by the require-
ment in section 32 (a) of the 1934 Act"' and section 24 of the 1933
Act ... that anyone who "willfully" violates the act in question will
suffer criminal penalties." 2 It is essential to distinguish between the
requirement that in order for a violation of the Securities Acts to be
criminal it must be "willful" and the requirement that in order for
aiding and abetting and conspiracy to be actionable the conduct must
be knowing or reckless. According to one commentator, the word
"willfully" has been construed, in criminal and disciplinary cases, in ac-
cordance with the SEC view that "the term does not require proof of
evil motive, or intent to violate the law, or knowledge that the law was
being violated." 3 A frequently used definition is the following:
It is only in very few criminal cases that "willful" means
"done with a bad purpose." Generally, it means "no more
concert of action. There may be circumstances in which mutual knowledge
should be inferred in the absence of specific proof.
Gusow v. United States, 347 F.2d 755, 759-60 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 906
(1965) (mail fraud case requiring "proof of intentional devising of a scheme to
defraud") :
Fraud or the existence of a fraudulent scheme is seldom susceptible to
proof solely by direct evidence and in nearly every such case, direct and
circumstantial evidence together with the inferences to be drawn therefrom
must be relied upon for proof.
(quoting from Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962)).
168 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
169 Id. at 400 (quoting from 76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods § 8 (1952)).
.70 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970).
171 Id. § 77x.
172 As Professor Loss points out, the word "willful" is one which "is construed at
least as diversely as it is spelled." 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrnTEs REGULATIO 1309 (2d ed.
1961).
173 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REG LATION 3368 (Supp. 1969) (footnote omitted).
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than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is
doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose
that he is breaking the law." "
That definition should not be accepted as the definition of the knowledge
requirement in conspiracy and aiding and abetting cases because it deals
only with satisfaction of the willfulness requirement.
The confusion between "willfulness" and "knowledge of illegal
activities" is illustrated in United States v. Benjiamin. That case
involved a financial fraud perpetrated by Mende, the principal promoter,
Benjamin, his lawyer, and Howard, a certified public accountant. The
court dealt with a conspiracy claim and objections by Howard and
Benjamin as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Although the court
found that both defendants had actual knowledge of the false asser-
tions,: 6 it defined the word "willful" in a manner that implied that
satisfaction of that definition would satisfy the "knowledge" require-
ment. It stated:
We think that in the context of § 24 of the Securities Act
[the criminal section containing the willful requirement] as
applied to § 17(a), the Government can meet its burden by
proving that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to facts
he had a duty to see . . .or recklessly stated as facts things
of which he was ignorant.
7 7
The danger in equating the two requirements is that the knowledge
requirement for conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability could be
reduced to a mere showing that the secondary party knew what he was
doing rather than a showing that he knew of the illegal plan or conduct.
174 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (quoting from Dennis v.
United States, 171 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1948), afftd, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), which
in turn quoted from Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938)), quoted in 5 L. Loss, SECURTIES REGULATION 3368 (Supp.
1969). Professor Loss questions whether this definition will stand review by the
Supreme Court, citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
5 L. Loss, SEcUTrrIEs REGULATIoN 3367-68 (Supp. 1969). More significantly, he
correctly distinguishes between the "willfulness" requirement of the Securities Acts
and the "knowledge" or "intent" requirement of the conspiracy or aiding and abetting
cases. Commenting on the decision in United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d
Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962), Professor Loss states that "intent is an
element o the offense" in a conspiracy case. 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
3369-70 (Supp. 1969).
75 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
176 Id. at 862 (Howard), 863 (Benjamin).
77Id. at 862, citing cases. The court continued by stating "[o]ther circuits
have gone further and have held the willfulness requirement of the Securities Acts
to be satisfied in fraud cases by proof of representations which due diligence would
have shown to be untrue." Id. at 863. The cited cases, however, Stone v. United
States, 113 F.2d 70, 72-74 (6th Cir. 1940), and United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d
625, 628-29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962), involved circumstances that
can be described as reckless rather than negligent conduct.
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A different and more enlightened approach to a similar problem
was taken by the Second Circuit in United States v. Crosby.78 There
the court reversed criminal convictions against brokers alleged to have
participated in a conspiracy to sell unregistered stock. The court
found that the government had failed to present any proof that the
brokers knew that the unregistered stock they were dealing with was
not exempt from the registration requirements." 9 The Crosby case
correctly requires close scrutiny of the acts and state of mind of each
individual defendant.
In a ruling on a motion to transfer, one lower court has stated the
knowledge requirement as follows:
While there is no tort in civil law which may be described as
"aiding and abetting," allegations alleging joint and concerted
actions, knowingly committed with knowledge of a purpose
accomplishing an alleged wrong are sufficient to sustain a
claim as a joint tort feasor.'
Emphasis upon knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the primary
wrongdoer, whether proved directly or by inference, should be heeded
by other courts.
To summarize, knowledge of the primary illegal course of conduct
should be required for aiding and abetting or conspiracy liability.
Deviation from this requirement would unreasonably impose liability on
secondary defendants. Adherence to the knowledge requirement still
allows imposition of liability in appropriate cases, since knowledge can
be shown by reckless conduct or through inference. The knowledge re-
quirement should not be confused with the less demanding "willfulness"
requirement used in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Finally, it should be
noted that although the good faith defenses in the controlling persons
sections will probably not be applicable to judicially construed secondary
liability theory, the knowledge requirement under conspiracy and aiding
and abetting theories effectively reintroduces the "good faith" defense
of those sections.
4. The Conspiracy Approach
In the framework of the present analysis, once it has been estab-
lished that an independent wrong exists and that the defendant knows
.78294 F2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
179 Id. at 942. See also United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
180 Wyndham Associates v. Bintliff, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SzC.
L. REP. 192,016, at 96,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). This is one of the Westec cases. See note 5 supra.
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of that wrong and its illegality, it will still be necessary to establish in
an aiding and abetting case that he gave substantial assistance to the
person engaged in the conduct, and in a conspiracy case that the de-
fendant agreed to join in the unlawful conduct.
As will be noted below, securities cases have not distinguished
clearly between charges that the secondary defendant "aided and
abetted" another person in achieving an unlawful result, and charges
that a secondary defendant "conspired" to help another accomplish that
unlawful result.'' The word "conspiracy" has been used expansively
in some cases to describe conduct more closely resembling aiding and
abetting. For instance, in H. L. Greene Co. v. Childree,8 2 the court
refused to dismiss a complaint against accountants "who, according to
the complaint, knowingly prepared false financial statements and made
other misrepresentations with intent to induce [a corporation] to
enter into [a] merger." 1'1 It held that the defendants would be subject
to liability if they "knowingly did acts pursuant to a conspiracy to
defraud." '1 In a recent case, SEC v. National Bankers Life Insurance
Co.,'"5 the court observed that the SEC had sought to hold all defend-
ants liable for joint participation in a "scheme to defraud" under sub-
section (1) of rule 10b-5 "on the basis that 'scheme' as used in that
subsection is synonymous with conspiracy." 186 The court stated that
even in the absence of statutory reference to a scheme or conspiracy, a
plaintiff "can allege a conspiracy" to violate the securities law. asr
If conspiracy to violate the securities laws is used as the basis for
a private right of action, courts should more carefully define the con-
spiracy concept. For such a purpose a whole series of inquiries becomes
relevant: 188
181 Text accompanying notes 188-93 infra.
182 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
18 3Id. at 96.
184 Id.
185 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
186 Id. at 195.
187 Id. The court also held that knowledge was a requirement. It characterized
the knowledge requirement as follows:
The knowledge requirement for liability under such a scheme is more than
that required to hold someone as an aider and abettor to a single sale of
unregistered stock or a single fraudulent act and probably something com-
parable to that required to hold a person liable as an aider and abettor to a
scheme to defraud-general awareness of overall improper conduct and that
the act performed in some way contributes to that conduct.
Id.
1
8 8 The following comments are derived in part from Brenner, Selected Jury
Instruction Forms in an SEC Criminal Case, 41 F.R.D. 93, 121-27 (1966).
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(1) Did an agreement exist to commit a violation of federal
securities law?
(2) Did the defendant know that the purpose of the agreement
was criminal?
(3) Did the defendant participate in the conspiracy, have knowl-
edge of its illegal purpose, and intend to aid in the accomplishment of its
illegal ends?
(4) Did one of the conspirators carry out an overt act in fur-
therance of the conspiracy?
(5) Was the overt act committed by a party to the alleged con-
spiracy after an illegal understanding had been reached? Did it tend
toward accomplishment of the intended illegal act of the conspiracy, and
did the person performing the act know and intend that it be such a
step ?
(6) Was there a single continuing overall conspiracy or were
there several independent conspiracies requiring individual proof?
(7) Was evidence of participation in the conspiracy drawn from
conduct or statements of the defendant rather than conduct or state-
ments of other defendants or co-conspirators made in his absence?
The above questions are frequently asked in criminal conspiracy
prosecutions involving securities law fraud. They have not been asked
in the reported cases dealing with civil liability. Although proof of
the necessary agreement, the necessary overt act, and other elements
of a criminal conspiracy presumably would be required to show the
existence of a conspiracy to violate the securities laws, the cases stating
that such a private right of action exists 189 do so without analysis. At-
tempts at clarity are further confused when courts express their willing-
ness to combine conspiracy and aiding and abetting as a single wrong.
For instance, in SEC v. National Bankers Life Insurance Co.9 ° the
court dealt with a complaint by the SEC, which it described as employ-
ing a "conspiracy theory" in the first count and "a joint scheme theory
which is comparable to conspiracy" in the second count.' 9' The court
treated the language of subsection (1) of rule 10b-5 as permitting an
action to be brought upon the basis of participation in "a scheme to
189E.g., I.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
But see Bryant v. Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 681, 687-88 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) (the federal
conspiracy statute does not support a private right of action).
190324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), a'ffd, 448 F2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
19: Id. at 194.
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defraud." 12 It characterized the word "scheme" as being synonymous
with "conspiracy," but, apparently not satisfied with this approach,
noted that:
For the purposes of this case, we will assume that the SEC
intended to allege that peripheral defendants were aiders and
abettors to a scheme or plan under subsection (1) and in this
sense were co-schemers. 93
This attempt to connect conspiracy to aiding and abetting demon-
strates the confusion that can be created by using conspiracy doctrine.
What the National Bankers Life court might have said was the
following:
(1) A defendant may be subject to liability for violating the
securities laws.
(2) He may be subject to liability for conspiring or scheming with
another to violate the securities laws.
(3) He may be subject to liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of the securities laws.
(4) He may be subject to liability for aiding and abetting a con-
spiracy or scheme to violate the securities laws.
Such an approach would preserve the dichotomy between con-
spiracy and aiding and abetting, by recognizing the necessity of proving
agreement in order to prove conspiracy and the necessity of proving the
existence of an act when proving aiding and abetting. It would not,
however, avoid the difficult conspiracy law questions posed above.
5. The Active-Passive Distinction in Aiding and
Abetting Cases
Perhaps because courts realize that conspiracy theory is hard to
apply, the securities law cases that have contained substantial analysis
have tended to use aider and abettor language.'94 The use of the aiding
and abetting theory may nevertheless achieve a result similar to con-
spiracy to the extent that liability can be based upon inaction. The
best support for an inaction theory appears in the lower court decision
192 Id. at 195.
193 Id. It also attempted to distinguish between the knowledge requirement
applicable to an aider and abettor of a single act and the knowledge requirement
applicable to an aider and abettor of a fraudulent scheme.
194 The SEC has made frequent use of the doctrine. See text accompanying
notes 114-22 supra.
19721
642 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
in the Brennan case,' 95 cited by the court in SEC v. National Bankers
Life Insurance Co. for the proposition that "a person may be held as an
aider and abettor through either an act or an omission." 196 Signif-
icantly, although the Seventh Circuit in the Brennan case 117 had before
it a decision of the district court that Midwestern was subject to liability
for failing to take action, it did not hold that inaction alone was suffi-
cient to sustain liability. The district court had held that by its failure
to report Dobich's activities to the SEC or to the Indiana Securities
Commission, Midwestern had "knowingly and purposefully encouraged
an artificial build-up in the market for its stock ... ," 198 The Seventh
Circuit stated:
It is our view that the district court was correct in concluding
that Midwestern's acquiescence through silence in the fraud-
ulent conduct of Dobich combined with its affirmative acts was
a form of aiding and abetting cognizable under Section 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5.' 99
It added that it reached its conclusion "[w] ithout deciding whether
the failure to report Dobich's activities to the Indiana Securities Com-
mission would in itself give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 . 200
Thus the question of whether inaction might cause liability was specif-
ically left open.
In Wessel v. Buhler,2°' the Ninth Circuit was faced with a con-
tention that a certified public accountant owed a duty to prospective
investors to disclose his knowledge of a corporation's irregular financial
conduct and of deficiencies in its financial records and by failing to
perform that duty he aided and abetted the principal wrongdoer. The
court rejected this contention:
We find nothing in Rule 10b-5 that purports to impose
liability on anyone whose conduct consists solely of inaction.
On the contrary, the only subsection that has any reference to
an omission, as distinguished from affirmative action, is sub-
section (2) providing that it is unlawful "to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
. . . not misleading," i.e., an omission occurring as part of
an affirmative statement. . . . We perceive no reason, con-
195 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
196 324 F. Supp. at 195.
197417 F.2d 147.
198 Id. at 154. The language is the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the
district court's holding.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 155.
201437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
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sonant with the congressional purpose in enacting the Secu-
rities and Exchange Act of 1934, thus to expand Rule lOb-5
liability. . . On the contrary, the exposure of independent
accountants and others to such vistas of liability, limited only
by the ingenuity of investors and counsel, would lead to
serious mischief.
202
The Wessel and Brennan cases, when read together, may help
resolve the question whether and under what circumstances a court
should impose liability for mere inaction. In its first opinion in the
Brennma case, 03 the district court dealt with a contention by the de-
fendant that "aiding, abetting, and giving assistance or encouragement
necessarily requires an affirmative act" and that Midwestern's silence
would not make it liable for damages caused by Dobich's wrong-
doing. " The court rejected what it termed "abstract and mechanical
distinctions between active and passive assistance," refusing "to hold
blindly that silence and inaction cannot constitute aiding and abetting
under any possible set of circumstances . *.".. 205 Instead, it indicated
that a defendant may be liable for aiding and abetting based upon silence
and inaction in those circumstances in which it has a duty to act. Al-
though it did not state what those duties might be, it was willing to
accept the possibility that a corporation's duties to its shareholders
might include the duty to inform them that a fraud in connection with
its stock was underway. The court also suggested the possibility that
insiders and others owing independent fiduciary duties might have an
obligation to make affirmative disclosures. 06
Similarly, in the Wessel case, the court was faced with a separate
contention that the defendant Jordan owed an obligation to prospective
investors to disclose knowledge concerning financial statements he knew
were inaccurate.207 The theory advanced there can be reconciled with
the lower court's opinion in the Brennan case to the extent that circum-
stances might exist in which an accountant would owe an independent
duty to investors to make disclosures regarding financial information
known to him. In such a case, however, the duty to disclose informa-
tion about wrongdoing exists independently, and the violation of the
federal securities laws rests upon an independent duty rather than upon
an aiding and abetting theory. As noted earlier, cases dealing with
accountants' liability, such as Fischer v. Kletz,2°s rest upon the theory
202 Id. at 283.
203 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
204Id. at 681.
2 05 Id. at 682.
200 Id. at 681.
207437 F.2d at 283.
208249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see
notes 74-88 supra & accompanying text.
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that there exists an independent duty to the injured party. Thus in
Fischer the court acknowledged possible liability for accountants who
know that their previously filed financial statements relied upon by the
public are no longer accurate. °9  So too, in Hecht v. Harris Upham &
Co.,210 the court was willing to impose liability upon the New York
partners of a brokerage firm for their failure to supervise an employee
in the San Francisco office under circumstances in which they had
reason to know that he was engaged in illegal churning activities. In
Fischer and Hecht the liability would be primary, not secondary.
On its facts, Wessel v. Buhler seems to be correctly decided because
the figures being used were not those that had been prepared by Jordan,
the accountant. Rather, it was alleged that after Jordan prepared cor-
rect financial figures, those figures were altered and used in their altered
form by the primary wrongdoers. Since Jordan had not certified the
figures actually used, he had no independent duty to warn of their
inaccuracy.
The above analysis points to the conclusion that "mere inaction"
should not give rise to liability under rule 10b-5 in the absence
of an independent duty to make disclosure of the primary wrong. If
such a duty does exist, liability for nondisclosure will be based upon
direct breach of a duty to disclose rather than upon an aiding and
abetting theory.21'
209 266 F. Supp. at 188.
210 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified & af'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970).
211 Additional support for the conclusion that positive assistance is necessary for
aiding and abetting liability in the absence of an independent duty to take action
appears through examination of the factual circumstances in which liability has been
imposed. The following cases are illustrative.
In SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1971),
all of the defendants were alleged to have purchased, sold, or pledged stock or to
have loaned money in knowing assistance of a fraudulent scheme to sell unregistered
securities and to manipulate securities markets.
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
the Seventh Circuit held that Midwestern affirmatively assisted Dobich in defrauding
his brokerage customers by referring directly to him the complaints of dissatisfied
customers who might otherwise have filed charges before the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Indiana Securities Commission. Id. at 154.
In SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970),
those defendants characterized as aiders and abettors helped to prepare reports, aided
in selling efforts, and otherwise helped to promote sale of unregistered stock through
false and misleading statements.
In Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the
brokerage company defendant and several banks were accused of permitting Lowell
Birrell to open and maintain dummy accounts in order to conceal his manipulative
activities about which they had knowledge, while the American Stock Exchange
specialists were charged with knowingly participating in illegal stock distributions.
Id. at 28.
In Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968), the
defendant brokerage firms were alleged to have aided and abetted the primary wrong-
doer by allowing him to use their office facilities and market materials, by supporting
statements that he was solvent, by endorsing his skill and standing as a commodities




One conclusion of this Article is that the liability of many defend-
ants who might otherwise be called secondary defendants will in fact
be primary, because of direct obligations owed by those defendants.
The defendant may, for instance, owe a duty as an accountant or a
stockbroker, or he may be a corporate insider owing special duties by
reason of that relationship.212 The defendant may be a stock exchange
or an association of securities dealers owing independent duties.21
In the absence of such duties and in the absence of direct participa-
tion in the wrongdoing, liability will depend upon application of
"secondary liability" concepts. The defendant may be subject to lia-
bility as a controlling person of a wrongdoer under express securities
law provisions.1" He may be liable under aspects of common law
agency theory. Where a defendant knows that a securities law fraud
is underway and lends his assistance to it, he may be subject to liability
under aiding and abetting or conspiracy doctrines. This Article has
suggested that liability does not attach under the latter doctrines in the
absence of knowledge by the defendant. Likewise, it has been suggested
that liability under aiding and abetting theories does not attach if the
defendant merely fails to take action.
These conclusions are consistent with the policies underlying secu-
rities regulation. Those defendants who have participated directly in a
securities law fraud will be subject to liability if their conduct satisfies
the elements required for proof of direct violation. The primary wrong-
doer will not escape liability. Additionally, those who have a separate
obligation to the public to take steps to prevent injury will be subject to
liability. Thus brokerage firms and stock exchanges may be subject to
liability for breach of their duty to supervise. Professionals, such as
In Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.
Ark. 1949), the defendant Merrill, Lynch assisted a correspondent dealer by encour-
aging him to state to the SEC that he carried on his business in segregated accounts
through Merrill, Lynch rather than in omnibus accounts. Id. at 122-23.
212 Cf. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'g 208 F. Supp.
808 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
2 1 3 See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944) ; Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Regard-
ing liability for violation of stock exchange rules, see Hoblin, A Stock Broker's
Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock
Exchange, 39 FoRDEIAM L. Rav. 253 (1970); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based
Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 CoLUm. L. REv. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private
Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based
on NASD Rules, 51 CoRNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for
Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENv. L.J. 63 (1970) ; Note, Federal
Margit Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 CoLUm. L. REv. 1462 (1966) ;
Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83
HARv. L. REv. 825 (1970) ; Comment, Civil Remedies and Stock Exchange Rules-
An Emerging Concept of Implied Liability, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 551.
214 Under § 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970), and §20 of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
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accountants and brokers, will have special duties arising out of their
relationships with the public. For instance, brokers may sustain lia-
bility for churning accounts, 215 making unsuitable recommendations,
216
or failing to have a reasonable basis for making recommendations. 1'
Accountants may be subject to liability for preparing misleading finan-
cial statements they know will be used by lenders and investors.218
Finally, those persons who are not primary wrongdoers and do not fall
within the special purviews of agency doctrines or the controlling per-
sons provisions will be subject to liability when they know of the exist-
ence of a securities law fraud and either enter into an agreement with
or give assistance to the primary wrongdoer.
Imposition of liability upon secondary defendants under aiding and
abetting or conspiracy theories as narrowly defined here can be justified
because of the culpable nature of their conduct. Such individuals will
be subject to liability because they have acted knowingly or recklessly
to assist fraudulent conduct or have agreed to be a part of a fraudulent
scheme. On the other hand, to impose liability upon those who merely
know of fraudulent conduct but have no separate duty to act or upon
those who assist in fraudulent conduct without knowing that the con-
duct is unlawful would unfairly extend liability to many persons whose
primary businesses are unrelated to the securities markets. Imposition
of liability upon lenders, financial printers, newspapers, landlords, credi-
tors, suppliers, minor employees, and others in such circumstances
would impose liability where the degree of fault is relatively minor.
II. CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNIFICATION, AND In Pari Delicto
The policy rationale offered in part I of this Article relies to a
large degree upon the belief that securities law policy includes both pro-
tection of investors and fairness toward defendants. 19 One aspect of
this fairness doctrine involves finding dividing lines based upon the duty
owed by the defendant, his knowledge, and his assistance in the illegal
scheme. If the defendant's duty is dependent upon his status within the
securities industry,220 liability may be imposed upon him when liability
2 1 5 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified
& aff'd, 430 F2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
216 See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (not a private action);
Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963
(1970) (private recovery may be based on NASD rules) (dictum).
2 1 7 Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
218 See text accompanying notes 64-98 supra.
2 1 9 The fairness concept has been advanced in another context in Ruder, Texas
Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Ride 10b-5 Purchase
and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968).
220 For, example, an exchange, broker-dealer, accountant, or corporate fiduciary.
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would not be imposed upon persons unconnected with the industry.
Where securities law liability exists because of activities that amount
to fraud 221 independent of special status, such liability should rest pri-
marily upon the defendant's fault. This fault analysis should apply
consistently even though the defendant may be either a primary or a
secondary wrongdoer.
Not only are fault principles important in determining whether
liability should exist at all, but they can be used to adjust burdens
among multiple defendants. If a court is able to distinguish between
the degrees of fault of the various parties when it imposes liablity, it
should be able to utilize such distinctions in determining how liabilities
should be divided. This portion of the Article will consider problems
of allocating liability in multiple defendant cases.
A. Contribution and Indemnification Distinguished
Assuming that many defendants are sued in the same action, a
defendant looking for relief from all or part of his liability may assert
doctrines of contribution and indemnification against other defendants.
The two doctrines should be carefully distinguished. Contribution in-
volves distributing losses among tortfeasors by requiring each to pay
his proportionate share. Indemnity entails shifting the entire loss from
one tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay it to another who, for
equitable reasons, should bear it instead."' In essence, contribution
results in a sharing of the burden, whereas indemnity results in
shifting it.
B. Contribution
Courts have had little difficulty in enforcing the right of contri-
bution where a contractual relationship gives rise to the parties' lia-
bility. 3 The more troublesome situation arises when a suit for contri-
bution is between joint or concurrent wrongdoers. The premise of a
suit for contribution by one wrongdoer against another is that the
parties are jointly responsible for the harm and therefore should share
221 Such as outright misrepresentations or stock manipulation.
222 W. PRossm, LAw OF TORTS 310 (4th ed. 1971) (paraphrased) (citing McFall
v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E2d 463
(1952)) ; see Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370-71,
104 N.W.2d 843, 846-47 (1960).
223 The most common illustration involves the rights of sureties who have paid
the obligation of their principal where there is more than one surety. Leflar, Contri-
bution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 135 (1932).
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the burden of the liability. Under English common law, contribution
usually was permitted only in favor of non-intentional wrongdoers.2 24
In general, it was said that the law will imply a promise for contribution
except where the wrongdoing was intentional. In 1898 one commenta-
tor stated:
As between conscious, wilful, malicious, or intentional joint
wrong-doers, or tort-feasors who are in part delicto, neither
the law nor equity will intervene to adjust the damage by en-
forcing contribution. -2 5
The early American courts, however, soon lost sight of the intentional,
non-intentional distinction and established the general rule that there
is to be no contribution between concurrent wrongdoers of any kind.2
Only a handful of American jurisdictions have judicially overruled
this no-contribution rule. These have returned to the intentional, non-
224 For an excellent analysis of the development of the right of contribution, see
Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather
v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REv. 176 (1898). Other treatments of contribution include
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 150
(1947) (more important for its discussion of the right to indemnity); Jones, Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 175 (1958) (opposing adoption of
a doctrine of contribution in Florida without close legal analysis) ; Leflar, supra note
223; Note, Aspects of the Right of Contribution Among Tort-feasors, 33 TEaiP. L.Q.
432 (1960) (discussing the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act) ; Comment,
Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 33 TENN. L. Rtv. 184 (1966) ;
Note, The Right of Contribution as Extended to Negligent Tortfeasors, 76 U. PA.
L. R~v. 979 (1928); Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 1960 Wis.
L. REv. 478. The important cases in the development of the doctrines of contribution
and indemnity are mostly early ones. As a result, there is an unusual consistency in
the citations from the early writings to the more recent ones.
225 Reath, supra note 224 (entire quotation in original in italics). Unfavorable
treatment of intentional wrongdoers appeared at least as early as 1623 in Batterseys
Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 41 (C.P. 1623). Other well-known early cases that reinforce
the distinction between intentional and non-intentional wrongdoers are Everet v.
Williams, 9 L.Q. REv. 197 (1893) (Ex. 1725), perhaps better known as the High-
wayman's Case, and Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
Merryweather is perhaps the most often cited case in discussions of the growth of
the right to contribution at common law. Although usually cited as stating the rule,
it states the exception. Faced with facts involving a claim for contribution between
two intentional tortfeasors, the court denied the right to contribution on the grounds
that there can be no such right where the primary liability stems from an intentional
wrongdoing.
226 The early American cases were consistent in allowing contribution between
negligent wrongdoers but not between intentional ones. An easy and unfortunately
common misinterpretation of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.
1799), apparently supplied some of the precedent for the later American no-contri-
bution doctrine. While Merryweather actually pronounced the exception, the opinion
also included a statement that there is to be no contribution between "tortfeasors."
However, in 1799, when the Merryweather opinion was handed down, a "tort" was
willful or intentional wrongdoing, and a "tortfeasor" was a willful or intentional
wrongdoer. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Many American
courts thus concluded that no contribution should be granted between tortfeasors of
any kind. E.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217
(1905) ; Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1967); see W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 306 (4th ed. 1971).
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intentional analysis as it existed earlier.22 7  The no-contribution rule
was based on the belief that a person's knowledge that he is responsible
for all the consequences of a wrong would induce him to exercise a
greater degree of care than he would exercise if he knew that any
liability from a joint endeavor could be shared. Rejection of the rule
has been based on a lack of faith in this proposition.228
An application of the strict American no-contribution rule would
result in the denial of contribution between all defendants in securities
law cases. An application of the intentional, non-intentional distinction
would change this result only in those cases where certain defendants
were subject to liability for non-intentional conduct.
Those few courts that have dealt with securities law contribution
problems have looked to the express provisions in the federal securities
acts dealing with contribution. In section 11(f) of the 1933 Act,
229
and in sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the 1934 Act,23 express provision
is made for contribution. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under
this subsection may recover contribution as in cases of contract
from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would
have been liable to make the same payment.23 '
Section 18(b) contains only a very minor variation. The language of
the 1933 Act is somewhat different but of the same effect:
[E]very person who becomes liable to make any payment
under this section may recover contribution as in cases of
contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have
been liable to make the same payment, unless the person who
has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraud-
ulent misrepresentation. "32
227 George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
see Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
228 See George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d at 220. Several
state legislatures also attacked the American no-contribution rule by enacting statutes
that allow contribution among joint tortfeasors in certain circumstances, but these
statutes are not uniform and provide little assistance. There has also been some
activity in the field of adopting a Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
but it has met with practically no success. See Note, Aspects of the Right of Con-
tribution Among Tort-feasors, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 432 (1960).
229 1933 Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. §77k(f) (1970).
230 1934 Act §§9(e), 18(b), 15 U.S.C. §§78i(e), 78r(b) (1970).
2 3 1 1d. §78i(e).
232 1933 Act §11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970). As to the effect of the last
clause ("unless . .") which on its face seems redundant, the following explanation
has been offered:
[I]t is probable, though not certain, that the parties liable on the registration
statement may by contract allocate inter se their liability. There is no doubt
but that such contracts were enforceable at common law. One exception to
this under the Act is the case where the party suing was guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentations while the party sued was not.
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.'. 171, 178-79
(1933) (footnote omitted).
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While no express provision for contribution was included in section
10(b) of the 1934 Act,233 the court in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co.234 utilized the above express statutory sections as a basis for imply-
ing such a right in a rule lOb-5 case. It reasoned very simply that the
same reasons for allowing contribution under the express provisions
for liability would apply under section 10(b) implied liability.33
The statutory language that expressly provides for contribution in
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts includes, in each instance, the key phrase
that the contribution is to be allowed "as in cases of contract." 236 This
provision in the 1933 Act was taken almost bodily from the British
Companies Act, and probably reflects attempts to eliminate undesirable
features present in the British common law as it existed in 1933.237 It
was probably intended also to eliminate the policy denying contribution
between intentional tortfeasors, as well as the American-invented no-
contribution rule.
23 8
The phrase "as in cases of contract" also aids in answering the
question: "According to what method is the contribution to be al-
lowed?" Theoretically contribution could be required either on a
pro-rata basis or on some basis involving a degree of fault analysis.
Since the Securities Acts incorporate the contract standard for con-
tribution between tortfeasors, the pro-rata method used in common law
contract cases should apply.
239
The significance of allowing pro-rata contribution without regard
to degree of fault is important to defendants. To the extent that con-
tribution is permitted without regard to fault, the manner of defense,
233 1934 Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970).
234 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 435 F.2d
1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
235 Id. at 815-16 (citing 3 L. Loss, Sacultrrms REGULATION 1739-40 n.178 (2d
ed. 1961)).
236 None of the congressional committee reports on either act reveals a legislative
interpretation of this phrase. 1933 Act: See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); H.R REP. No. 152, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). 1934 Act: See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ;
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
237 Douglas & Bates, supra note 232, at 178 & n.30. The phrase eliminates the
problem created by the death of one tortfeasor before judgment, and permits contri-
bution from the executor of his estate. The doctrine that is avoided is "actio personalis
moritur curn persona," literally, "a personal right of action dies with the person."
Batard v. Hawes, 118 Eng. Rep. 775 (Q.B. 1853), indicates that in cases of a contract
for contribution where one co-contractor dies before the action is brought, the executor
of the deceased's estate is liable for his aliquot share.
238 See Douglas & Bates, supra note 232, at 178 n.30.
239 Where there are several defendants held liable, common law cases direct the
payment of an equal share by each. See, e.g., Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid,
221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966). The pro-rata method is also easier to
administer, and has been directed by the court in a securities case, Globus, Inc. v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part & revd
in part per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
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decisions to implead other defendants, and considerations regarding
settlement will be affected by the doctrine. If the damages will be
large, defendants may wish to add as many other defendants as possible
in order to spread the cost of ultimate liability.
240
C. Indemnification
A determination that recovery by the plaintiff will be divided
pro-rata between the defendants through the application of contribution
principles does not eliminate the possibility that one wrongdoer may
sue another wrongdoer seeking indemnity for his losses. 4 ' In contrast
to contribution doctrine, the Securities Acts contain no specific pro-
visions relating to indemnification. Although one court, the Fifth
Circuit, has stated in dictum that indemnification between joint tort-
feasors will not be allowed in a securities law case,242 another court, the
Second Circuit,243 has indicated that it would make indemnification
available under appropriate circumstances.
In the absence of settled doctrine, common law principles of in-
demnity may be useful in providing background for deciding the
proper approach in securities law cases. The most obvious common
law illustrations involve situations in which the indemnified party is
not at fault. For instance, many decisions in the respondeat superior
field hold that the innocent master can obtain indemnity from his
servant.244  Similarly, in non-delegable duty cases the person owing the
240 Of course, the result may be different where the damages are assessed upon
individual defendants under a theory calling for disgorgement of profits. E.g., SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1301
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
241 For a good review of the field, see Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent
Tort!easors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517 (1952); Meriam &
Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-Feasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York
Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 845 (1950); W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS § 51
(4th ed. 1971) ; sources cited note 224 supra.
2 42 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 n.7 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'g 286
F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
2 43 See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir.
1969), aff'g 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
244 A typical example, and often cited case, is Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244
(1875) ; accord, Fedden v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199
N.Y.S. 9 (1923). Plaintiff in Smith v. Foran was a common carrier whose defendant-
servant negligently damaged a piano that plaintiff was transporting and that was in
defendant's care. Plaintiff paid the piano owners in settlement for the damage, and
its action for indemnity from defendant was sustained.
The respondeat superior situation has particular application to those securities
law cases where a corporation has been held liable for the unlawful activity of its
directors, officers, or other agents. The corporation's cause of action for indemnity
was established in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 816 (D. Colo.
1968).
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non-delegable duty may recover from a third party who actually
caused the injury.
245
Where an agent voluntarily and innocently commits a tortious act
at the direction of his principal, the principal will usually be ordered to
indemnify his agent. Gower v. Emery 24 involved an agent who in-
nocently attached certain properties at the direction of his principal, and
who later was held liable in damages for trespass. In granting in-
demnity to the agent the court noted that:
In such a case, a promise of indemnity is implied, upon the
principles of natural justice. Had the order been to do a
known wrong, no such promise would have been implied....
[I]f an agent, by order of his principal, commits a tres-
pass upon the property of another, acting bona fide, without
any suspicion of wrong, he has a claim for reimbursement
upon his principal, for all the damages he sustains thereby." 7
The common denominator in these three situations is that in-
demnity flows from one whose degree of fault is greater to one whose
degree of fault is lesser. These situations do not present the crucial
analogy for securities law cases, however, because in all of the examples
the party seeking indemnification is innocent. In contrast, where con-
current wrongdoers are involved, the degree of fault question is the
heart of the inquiry.
Various state jurisdictions have attempted to establish guidelines
in cases involving concurrent wrongdoers, with little success in identi-
fying helpful policy. One rationale is the "primary-secondary" test,
under which the "primary" wrongdoer will indemnify the person whose
activity was only "secondary." 248 This primary-secondary test seems
245 The most common example is the municipal corporation, which is held liable
for injuries sustained by a person on its streets and sidewalks on the theory that it
has a non-delegable duty to maintain its streets and sidewalks in a safe condition.
When the hazard which causes the injury is created by a third party the municipal
corporation is allowed indemnity. Typical of this group and often cited is Washington
Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896). There, damages had
been recovered by an injured party from the District of Columbia for injuries sus-
tained from a gas fixture protruding above the level of the sidewalk. The gas company
had a duty to maintain and repair the gas fixture. The Court held that the District
of Columbia had a cause of action against the gas company for indemnity. Id. at
327-28.
246 18 Me. 79 (1841).
247 Id. at 83; accord, Adamson v. Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827); Betts v.
Gibbins, 111 Eng. Rep. 22 (1834) ; Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633 (1855).
248 An Illinois appellate court has stated the test as follows:
The law of this State recognizes that a party who is only secondarily respon-
sible for the plaintiff's injuries has a right to recover indemnity over against
the person primarily responsible.
Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 334, 336-37, 201 N.E.2d 322, 323
(1964).
For a classic case showing the difficulty of applying this test, see American
Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1950).
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only to be a restatement of the common denominator of the three earlier
examples. It provides little help in measuring the degree of fault.
Some common law courts have approached the indemnification
problem in a different manner, by establishing an "active-passive"
dichotomy, under which indemnity will be allowed to one whose negli-
gence is "passive," from one whose negligence is "active." '49 Under
this test, "active" negligence is defined as affirmative or positive
activity, while "passive" negligence is the failure to do something that
should have been done.
2 5 0
Despite early approval of the active-passive test, state courts have
found the test difficult to apply in a manner that assists in predicting
outcome. The problem with the test is that the labels "active" and
"passive" may merely be descriptive of the result which is desired. For
instance, in City of Weatherf ord Water, Light & Ice Co. v. Veit,25' a
Texas case, a telephone company employee was injured by an electrical
shock from an electric company's wires which ran parallel to, but below
the telephone wires he was sent to repair. After paying damages to the
employee, the electric company sought indemnification from the tele-
phone company.25 2  Indemnification was awarded on the theory that
the electric company had been "passive" and the telephone company
"active" in its negligence.2  In order to reach an opposite result in
that case it would only have been necessary to reverse the descriptive
terms, calling the telephone company "passive" and the electric com-
pany "active."
Dissatisfaction with the active-passive test has caused the Texas
courts to drop that test in favor of one that analyzes the duties each
tortfeasor owes to his co-tortfeasor. Under this theory, indemnity
flows from the tortfeasor who has breached such a duty to one who
has not.254  This theory, too, has failed to produce any certainty in the
249 Courts also express the dichotomy between the wrongs of the tortfeasors by
a "commission-omission" test, which is but another formulation of the "active-passive"
test. See, e.g., City of Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 271-72, 57 S.W. 1107, 1111
(1900) ; note 253 infra.
250 English v. Miller, 33 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
251 196 S.W. 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
252Id. at 989.
2 5 3 The court stated that maintaining the uninsulated high voltage wire on the
telephone pole merely created a dangerous condition. This conclusion, however, is
in contradiction to the general rule that the tortfeasor who has created the danger
will be deemed "active." See, e.g., W. PRossER, LAW oF TORTS § 52, at 312 (4th ed.
1971).
254 One district court made this summary of the change:
The right of indemnity has long been recognized to exist between joint
tort-feasors where the negligence of the two was of a different degree of
culpability. Many of the older cases have permitted indemnity in favor of
one whose negligence was "passive" against the other whose negligence was
"active", or in favor of one whose wrong was one of "omission" against the
other whose wrong was one of "commission". . . . But this is a most
1972]
654 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Texas law. In one Texas case the analysis produced three different
results in three successive levels of litigation. 5 Furthermore, the test
seems no more than a statement that indemnity will be allowed from
one concurrent tortfeasor to another if a different degree of fault can
be shown.
None of the foregoing rationales seem to solve the indemnity
dilemma when concurrent tortfeasors are involved. There is, however,
a common thread based upon degree of fault, which may lead to sound
doctrine where concurrent wrongdoers have breached securities laws.
The court in United States v. Savage Truck Lines, Inc.2" 6 used the
degree of fault approach, stating:
In the infinite variety of circumstances where indemnity has
been sought the courts have used various terms to distinguish
between the grade of fault attributable to the participating
wrongdoers so as to justify the imposition of the entire loss
on the one who is regarded as the principal offender. The
acts of the parties are variously contrasted as positive or nega-
tive . . .and as active and passive.
Whatever the terminology, the inquiry is always whether
the difference in the gravity of the faults of the participants is
so great as to throw the whole loss upon one. In such event
there is contribution in the extreme form of indemnity.
2 57
In seeking common law analogies for construction of proper con-
tribution and indemnification doctrine under the securities laws, the
Restatement of Restitution may provide a point of reference. Section
88 takes the position that "A person who has discharged a tort claim
to which he and another were subject . . . is barred from restitution
uncertain and unsatisfactory test, made to depend upon the manner of expres-
sion rather than the quality of the wrong.
In three recent cases . . . the Supreme Court of Texas seems to have
laid aside the "passive" versus "active" negligence test and announced the
rule that indemnity between tort-feasors lies only where one tort-feasor
breaches a duty which he owes to the other (as distinguished from the breach
of duty which each has committed as to the plaintiff).
Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 262-63 (S.D. Tex. 1950)
(footnotes omitted). See generally Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 26 TExAs L. REv. 150 (1947).
255 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W2d 995 (1949).
Still another proposed rationale for determining when to award indemnity from
one concurrent tortfeasor to another suggests that the nature of the duties that each
tortfeasor owes to the injured person should determine the result. Under this theory,
indemnity should flow from the one who breached the less stringent duty to the one
who breached the more stringent duty. Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tort-
feasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517 (1952).
256 209 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1953).
257 Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added).
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if his tort involved seriously wrongful conduct." 25s The Restatement
comment is the following:
c. Public policy prevents restitution in favor of a person who,
whether or not by agreement with or at the request of an-
other, has committed a seriously wrongful act. It is a matter
for judicial discretion to determine whether an act is so
seriously wrongful as to bar restitution under the particular
circumstances. Normally consciously criminal conduct in-
cluding dishonest conduct involving theft, embezzlement or
fraud would be considered to be seriously wrongful. Like-
wise, a person is guilty of seriously wrongful conduct if he
acts in reckless disregard of the interests of others; he is reck-
less if he acts knowing or having reason to know facts from
which a reasonable man would realize that such conduct in-
volves a high degree of probability of substantial harm to
another." 9
This Restatement position that serious misconduct will bar a claim
for indemnification presents a reasonable rationale for securities law
purposes. The Restatement position could be interpreted as saying that
indemnification should be denied between parties who are equally cul-
pable: a rule that one who has been seriously criminal, dishonest, or
reckless in his conduct may not be indemnified by another says essen-
tially that the culpability of a person seeking indemnification must be
significantly different from that of the person from whom he hopes to
receive such indemnification. Indemnification results under these
theories would be consistent with a degree of fault analysis.
258 RESTATEMENT op RESTITUTION § 88(b) (1937).
259 Id., comment on clause (b) at 395; See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 500 (1934).
The Restatement's position that a concurrent tortfeasor cannot claim restitution
from another if his conduct is seriously wrong is repeated in § 89 of the Restatement
of Restitution as follows:
§ 89. ToRT INDUcED BY FRAUD.
A person who is induced by the fraud of another to believe that his
conduct is lawful and in reliance upon that belief does an act because of which
both are liable in tort, is entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures
properly made in the discharge of such liability if, as between the two, his
reliance was justifiable.
Comment:
a. A person who, with reason to know of the consequences, knowingly
makes a misrepresentation to another which induces the other to commit a
tortious act is ordinarily himself liable for such tort. The same liability
attaches where the tort is induced by the intentional failure to disclose facts
by one having a duty to disclose them. Reliance upon the fraudulent mis-
representation and belief in its truth by the payor are essential to restitution,
but it is not a bar to restitution that he was careless in so relying or believing.
In accordance with the rule stated in § 88(b), however, the payor would be
barred if his conduct was seriously criminal, dishonest or reckless.
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Two cases, deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co. 260 and Globus v.
Law Research Service, Inc.261 have applied comparative fault concepts,
illustrating approaches federal courts can be expected to take when
dealing with indemnification in the securities law context.
2 2
The deHaas case was a shareholders derivative action under rule
10b-5 against Empire Petroleum Company, American Industries, Inc.,
and Stone, who was the chief executive officer of both corporations. The
complaint alleged that proxy materials used in connection with a merger
were misleading and therefore violated rule 10b-5. Both Stone and
Empire filed third-party complaints seeking indemnification and con-
tribution from Loeffler, who had served as legal counsel for the corpo-
rations, alleging that Loeffler had prepared the misleading proxies.
2 63
In response to a motion seeking to dismiss the third-party complaints,
the court distinguished between the defendant Stone and the defendant
Empire. With regard to Stone, the court stated that the plaintiffs could
not succeed on the original complaint unless they could prove "that he
knowingly participated in the allegedly fraudulent scheme." 26 It then
stated, "If Stone is found guilty of fraud on the main complaint, he
would be in pari delicto with Loeffler, and would not be entitled to in-
demnification from him . .. ," 265 The court apparently acted on the
theory that a defendant cannot obtain indemnification from another
wrongdoer if the defendant is equally culpable. 66
The court treated Empire's indemnification complaint differently,
stating that since Empire's liability would attach only because of the
fraudulent conduct of its agent, it would not be barred from seeking
indemnification from those agents (officers and directors) "who directly
260 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969), 302 F.
Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970).
261 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
262 The Globus case deals also with problems of contribution. One of the lower
court opinions in that case expressed the proposition that both contribution and
indemnity will be governed "by federal law." Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part & rev'd in part per
curtam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). The court of
appeals opinion expressly accepted the opinion of Judge Frankel reaching the latter
conclusion. See also Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 n.7 (5th Cir.
1969) (dictum).
263 286 F. Supp. at 815. The third-party complaint was filed under Fa. R. CIV.
P. 14.
264 286 F. Supp. at 815.
265 Id.
266 The result is also consistent with the Restatement of Restitution position that
serious wrongdoing will bar indemnification. Note that despite the no-indemnification
result, the court did not dismiss Stone's third-party complaint demanding contribution,
ruling that contribution among intentional wrongdoers would be permitted under the
Securities Acts. 286 F. Supp. at 815. See text accompanying notes 223-40 supra.
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participate in the fraud." 267 In reaching this decision the court ap-
parently adopted the degree of fault rationale permitting a principal to
assert a claim of indemnification against his agent. 68
The Globus case also involved a claim for indemnification in a
securities law context. In that case, Law Research Service, Inc., sold
stock to the public under regulation A pursuant to an offering circular
held to be misleading. Both the company and the underwriter were
found to be liable under the Securities Acts,269 but the underwriter, Blair
& Co., asserted a claim for indemnification against Law Research
Service, Inc., resting upon an indemnity clause in the underwriting
agreement. Although Blair asserted that it was merely a passive joint
tortfeasor, the Second Circuit noted that the jury had necessarily found
"that Blair had actual knowledge of the material misstatements" 270 and
stated that "[i]t is well established that one cannot insure himself
against his own reckless, willful or criminal misconduct." 271 It ad-
vanced the rationale that to tolerate indemnity under such circumstances
"would encourage flouting the policy of the common law and the
Securities Act." 272
It is not clear whether the court was adopting a theory that in-
tentional or reckless tortfeasors would be barred from seeking indem-
nification or whether it was engaged in a degree of fault analysis. An
apparent willingness to rely on a degree of fault theory and perhaps to
award indemnification may be found, however, in the court's statement
that it was considering "only the case where the underwriter has com-
mitted a sin graver than ordinary negligence." 273
The complementary relationship between indemnity principles and
contribution principles was indicated when Blair later sought to obtain
267Id. at 816 (citing Handel-Maatschappi H. Albert De Bary & Co., N.V. v.
Faradyne Electronics Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
268 Later appeals in the deHaas case did not involve the contribution or indemni-
fication points.
2691933 Act §17(a), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (1970); 1934 Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§78j(b) (1970); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1971).
270 418 F.2d at 1288.
271 Id.
272 Id. The denial of indemnity was also partially based on the views that such
indemnity is contrary to public policy and that underwriters should be denied indemnity
along with other controlling persons. This problem is beyond the bounds of this
discussion, but has been extensively dealt with elsewhere. See Note, Indemnification
of the Corporate Insider: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 54 MirN. L.
REv. 667 (1970) ; Comment, Insider Indemnification and the Supremacy Clause: The
Three Faces of Fraud, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 523 (1968) ; Comment, Indemnification of
Directors for Section 11 Liability, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 661 (1970) ; Note, Indemnifica-
tion of Underwriters and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406
(1962).
273 418 F.2d at 1288. The court seemed to ignore this rationale, however, when
it discussed the problems that would exist under § 11 of the 1933 Act if underwriters
who might be subject to liability for negligence could pass their liability onto the
issuer through indemnity agreements. The latter discussion might, however, be
limited to § 11, which expressly provides for liability based upon negligence.
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contribution from Law Research Services, Inc., and its president. The
Second Circuit had earlier denied indemnification on the theory that
such denial would "encourage diligence, investigation and compliance
with the requirements of the statute by exposing issuers and under-
writers to the substantial hazard of liability for compensatory dam-
ages." 274 In a later proceeding it agreed that contribution could be
granted even though the two parties were equally culpable.27 5 It cited
with approval a district court opinion stating that even though the two
parties "stood equally culpable and equally responsible" 271 contribution
would be permitted. The lower court treated an attempt to escape
contribution as equal to an attempt to gain indemnification. Either
effort was viewed as an opportunity to nullify securities law liability "by
leaving the whole of the burden" to the other concurrent tortfeasor .2 7
Although the Globus and deHaas decisions together stand for the
proposition that equally culpable defendants will be able to obtain
contribution, but will not be able to assert rights of indemnification,2 78
neither decision answers the basic question whether securities law de-
fendants may assert rights of indemnification when the degrees of fault
are substantially different. The question may be posed in another
way as well: Will contribution be denied when the party seeking
contribution is clearly more culpable than the party from whom he seeks
contribution? A consistent answer to both of these questions based
upon degree of fault analysis should result when one of two tortfeasors
is substantially more culpable than the other. In that situation con-
tribution would be denied to the more culpable party and indemnification
would be awarded to the less culpable party. This result would be con-
sistent with securities law policy by strengthening deterrence against
more grevious wrongs while minimizing the effect of extending secu-
rities law liability.
Application of this result to parties liable under aiding and abetting
or conspiracy theory would usually result in indemnification being
denied and contribution being awarded. If earlier analysis in this
Article regarding secondary defendants is correct, true secondary liabil-
ity will attach only in those cases in which the defendant knew that the
primary participant was engaged in an activity in violation of the secu-
rities laws and either rendered active assistance to him or affirmatively
indicated his agreement to join the unlawful conduct. 9 Under such
274418 F.2d at 1289.
275 Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971),
aff'g in part 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
276 318 F. Supp. at 957.
27 7 Id. at 958.
278 Either by contract or by implication.
279 Text accompanying notes 146-211 supra.
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circumstances it would seem difficult for a so-called secondary defendant
to assert that his degree of fault was so significantly different from that
of the primary defendant that indemnification should be allowed. On
the other hand, if the earlier analysis is incorrect and liability can be
imposed upon a secondary defendant for negligent conduct or for
knowing failure to take action under circumstances in which no inde-
pendent duty to take action exists, 2 0 the differences in conduct might be
sufficient to justify granting an implied right of indemnification.
D. In Pari Delicto
Although problems of contribution and indemnification have not
received extensive analysis under the securities laws, the concept of
degree of fault has been advanced in securities law cases and other
cases as a means of deciding whether to accept a defense of unclean
hands or in pari delicto.2s' One application of the in pari delicto defense
is that a plaintiff who has participated in a wrong may not recover
for his injuries.82 The in pari delicto cases can help in identifying the
degrees of fault that must exist in order to warrant indemnity." 3 Al-
though precise differentials cannot be identified, policies articulated in
280 Text accompanying notes 146-211 supra.
281 Literally "in equal fault," the phrase is sometimes used to deny indemnity.
A basic statement of the in pari delicto rationale for denying indemnity is found in
Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co.. 114 Mass. 149, 154 (1873):
When two parties, acting together, commit an illegal or wrongful act, the
party who is held responsible in damages for the act cannot have indemnity
or contribution from the other, because both are equally culpable, or participes
criminis, and the damage results from their joint offence. This rule does not
apply when one does the act or creates the nuisance, and the other does not
join therein, but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage. He may
recover from the party whose wrongful act has thus exposed him. In such
cases the parties are not in pari delicto as to each other, though as to third
persons either may be held liable.
The court's use of the word "contribution" is not proper, but such misuse is not
uncommon. See Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 214 Ky. 822,
284 S.W. 104 (1926); Cincinnati & C.R.R. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 97 Ky. 128, 30
S.W. 408 (1895); Churchill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165 (1879), 131 Mass. 67 (1881).
This in pari delicto rationale for determining an award of indemnity has been subject
to attack. It may be contended that a statement to the effect that the parties are
it pari delicto, and, therefore, are to be denied indemnity, is no more than sympto-
matic of a conclusion already reached. The analysis which follows is intended, in
part, to dampen this criticism as regards indemnity in securities lawsuits.
282 The typical pleading situation that gives rise to these cases involves receipt
of a complaint demanding damages followed by defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff's own conduct bars his recovery. Sometimes the defendant
asserts an in pari delicto defense, sometimes he claims that the plaintiff has unclean
hands, and sometimes he maintains that the plaintiff is contributorily negligent.
Regardless of the defendant's description, defendant is claiming that the law will not
allow the pot to call the kettle black.
283 An analysis of the in par delicto defense has been made, and in greater detail
than it will be made here, in Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity
of Common Law Defenses to Private Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1970). See also Comment, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar
to Recovery Under the Securities Acts: In Pari Delicto, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 181
(1969).
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cases dealing with the in pari delicto defense will be useful in consider-
ing the indemnification-contribution degree of fault doctrines.
The securities law cases dealing with the in pari delicto defense
seem to rest on either of two familiar securities law policies. One is
that deceptive and manipulative practices should be deterred. The other
is that members of the investing public should be able to recover when
wronged. These two objectives, deterrence and compensation, do not
necessarily result in consistent application of the in pari delicto doctrine.
The deterrence policy sometimes supports the in pari delicto de-
fense on the theory that to allow the plaintiff to recover where he
participated in the wrong would be to encourage fraudulent practices.
Cases following this approach usually hold that the plaintiff is in pari
delicto and grant the motion to dismiss. For instance, in Kuehnert v.
Texstar Corp.21 plaintiff bought Texstar stock on the basis of a false
tip. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff was in pari delicto the district court stated that "the tippee
• must be painted with the same brush and the same color as the
insider from whom the tippee receives his information." 2s5
The in pari delicto defense has been used to bar plaintiffs' suits
based on alleged violations of regulations T 286 and U. 28 7  In Serzysko
284286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
285 Id. at 345. The court of appeals elaborated on the policy aspects as follows:
It is true that if a tippee has no remedy against an insider's private false-
hoods, little deterrent against such conduct will exist; the insider may have
free rein. But, as against this, there is another danger. If a tippee can sue
he has, in effect, an enforceable warranty that secret information is true. It
is then he that will have free rein ...
[I]n view of the substantial deterrent pressures already felt by the
corporate insider, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. [401 F2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)] we think it important that tippees,
who present the same threat to the investing public as do insiders themselves,
should be offered appropriate discouragement. We conclude that the better
choice is to leave upon persons believing themselves tippees the restraint
arising from the fear of irretrievable loss should they act upon a tip which
proves to have been untrue. Hence the loss must lie where it falls.
412 F.2d at 705. Relying on the Kuehnert reasoning, the court in Wohl v. Blair &
Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), also granted a motion to strike defenses based
upon the in pari delicto doctrine. In Wohl plaintiffs sued a broker, claiming they
had made stock purchases based upon false tips supplied by him. Plaintiffs attempted
to distinguish Kiehnert on the basis that where inside information is received through
a broker, application of the in pari delicto defense would encourage brokers to defraud.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, emphasizing that the anti-inside informa-
tion policy of the securities laws precludes their recovery. The defense has, however,
been rejected in a similar case, Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
286 While the issue of plaintiffs' actual participation in the alleged violations of
regulation T, 12 C.F.R. §§220.1-.8 (1971), was deemed to be a triable issue which
could not be determined by a summary judgment, the court in Moscarelli v. Stamm,
288 F. Supp. 453, 459-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) stated:
It is fairly obvious that Congress did not intend to protect investors at all
times and under all circumstances regardless of their conduct.
It follows that the [defendant] broker's implied civil liability is not
absolute but is subject to the traditional tort concepts of causation and con-
tributory negligence or analogous conduct.
28712 C.F.R. §§221.1-.4 (1971).
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
v. Chase Manhattan Bank 2 s plaintiff sued for damages caused by loans
allegedly made to him in violation of regulation U. The court noted
that the plaintiff had induced the wrong and denied relief:
It is the view of the Court that to allow the plaintiff to recover
in this action would be to encourage rather than discourage
deception on the part of investor-borrowers with resulting
prejudice to the observance of the margin requirements of
the Act.28 9
The compensation perspective usually has resulted in the denial of
the in pari delicto defense. This approach includes as those deserving
protection even persons who have been involved in the schemes. The
Supreme Court noted the overriding effect of legislative policy by deny-
ing the unclean hands defense in A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene
Mines Corp.,290 a case involving unregistered securities. Application
of the compensation theory in credit regulation cases usually has caused
the in pari delicto defense to be denied. For instance, in Remar v.
Clayton Securities Corp.,29'1 the defendant broker-dealer had arranged
for loans to be made to the plaintiff to finance stock purchases in vio-
lation of regulation U. In denying an in pari delicto defense, the court
stated:
Broadly stated, the rule is that where defendant's violation of
a prohibitory statute has caused injury to plaintiff, the latter
288 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
289 290 F. Supp. at 89-90.
290 312 U.S. 38 (1941). This case was concerned with a violation of the regis-
tration provisions of the 1933 Act. Plaintiff had attempted to enforce an option
contract by which he was to be credited with the proceeds in excess of 10 cents per
share from the sale of stock of Coeur d'Alene Mines Corporation being sold by that
company. The company defended the suit on the grounds that the original contract
called for sale in violation of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act and was
therefore void and unenforceable. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed, but the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed, primarily in reliance upon an SEC memorandum
suggesting that if this contract was "void" no contract between an issuer and an
underwriter could be enforced if the registration provisions were violated. The SEC
had said:
It is obvious that the purposes of the Act would be defeated by any judicial
doctrine which prevented the issuing corporation from recovering from the
underwriter, and putting to the intended use in its business, the money invested
by the public in the issuer. And it would be anomalous to rest such an injury
to the investors upon the fact that the transaction in which the securities
were distributed violated the Act, which was designed to protect those
investors....
It appears to us to be entirely immaterial whether in such a case, the
agreement is labelled "void" or the parties are held to be "in pari delicto."
There, labels, as often is the case, merely state the conclusion reached, but
do not aid in solution of the problem. The ultimate issue is whether the
result in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate the purposes of the
Act.
Id. at 43-44 n.2 (emphasis added).
29181 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
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has a right of action if one of the purposes of the enactment
was to protect individual interests like the plaintiff's.292
Although it can be expected that courts will continue to use the
deterrence and compensation policies to justify application or non-
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto in securities law cases, the
conflicting nature of these two objectives yields little promise for pre-
dictability. If the degree of fault analysis is added to the in pari delicto
cases, however, the policy of protecting the general investing public by
providing compensation will be favored. Under this approach, unless
the degrees of fault are truly indistinguishable or the fault of the plain-
tiff is clearly greater, the defense of in pari delicto should not be allowed
and the plaintiff should be compensated.293
A degree of fault analysis was employed by the court in Can-Am
Petroleum Co. v. Beck.29 There, the plaintiff sued to recoup money
she had paid to defendant for an undivided interest in certain oil and
gas leases, on the ground that the securities were not registered in ac-
cordance with the 1933 Act. Plaintiff also had encouraged other in-
vestors to purchase similar interests in return for a greater fractional
share interest for herself. In rejecting defendant's in pari delicto de-
fense, the Tenth Circuit stated:
One who sells securities in violation of the Act will find no
comfort in his own incidental investment when he seeks re-
covery against his equally culpable associates. . . . But an
investor does not waive or lose the shelter of the Act because
he becomes to some extent involved in the illegality of the
security sales. The reason for such a rule has been aptly
stated: "In such event, since the policy of the law designed to
discourage illegal agreements comes in conflict with that
policy which demands the effective enforcement of the Corpo-
rate Securities Act, the law differentiates the guilt of the
parties, because refusal of relief to the less culpable would in-
volve harmful effects wholly out of proportion to the require-
ments of individual punishment or the discouragement of
illegal contracts." 29
292 Id. at 1017. Answering the question of whether the plaintiff's right of action
was affected by his participation as borrower in the transaction in which the broker-
dealer had violated the statute, the court stated that:
Since the statute was passed for the benefit of people like plaintiff, and since
the Legislature regarded him as incapable of protecting himself, he is not
disabled from suing for the injury he sustained.
Id.
293 Clearly the question whether the defense of in pari delicto will be permitted
"rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
294 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
295 Id. at 373, quoting Miller v. California Roofing Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 136,
143-144, 130 P.2d 740, 745 (1942) ; see Note, Corporate Indemnification for 10b-5
Violations, 70 CoLuam. L. REv. 504 (1970).
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Plaintiff was found to have "adulterated" her stance as a pure investor
when she assisted in selling the securities to others, "but she at no time
had the degree of culpability attributed to defendants and should not be
considered as in pari delicto." 296
The most authoritative acceptance of a degree of fault analysis with
regard to the in pari delicto defense appears in the United States
Supreme Court decision in an antitrust case, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp."'7 Plaintiffs in Perma Life sought to re-
cover damages based upon illegal contracts to which they were a party.
The several opinions in that case, which denied an in pari delicto de-
fense, collectively point toward acceptance of a degree of fault theory.
The majority opinion (written by Justice Black) seemed to acknowl-
edge that a truly active plaintiff would be barred: "[w]e need not de-
cide, however, whether such truly complete involvement and participa-
tion in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from
the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action, for in
the present case the factual picture respondents attempt to paint is
utterly refuted by the record." 298 The four additional opinions recog-
nize the general principle that the doctrine of in pari delicto will be
available when the parties are relatively equal in fault.299
296 331 F2d at 373-74. See also Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.
1941). The equal fault prerequisite for sustaining an in pari delicto defense was
stressed in Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970). There the
court, finding that Westec was not in equal fault with defendants, dismissed an
it pari delicto defense. Id. at 1106.
297 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See generally Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as
Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965) ; Note, Unclean
Hands: The Effect of Plaintiff's Antitrust Violations in, Antitrust Actions, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 1071 (1965). Two cases that are important as background to the current
law are Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951),
and Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co.,
209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953).
298 392 U.S. at 140.
299 The relevant language is as follows:
Justice White (concurring) :
Generally speaking, however, I would deny recovery where plaintiff and
defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of
them but permit recovery in favor of the one less responsible where one is
more responsible than the other.
Id. at 146.
Justice Fortas (concurring in result):
If the fault of the parties is reasonably within the same scale-if the
"delictum" is approximately "par"-then the doctrine should bar recovery.
: . . But equality of position of this general nature is necessary before
im par delicto may apply to bar an antitrust remedy.
Id. at 147.
Justice Marshall (concurring in result):
I would hold that where a defendant in a private antitrust suit can show that
the plaintiff actively participated in the formation and implementation of an
illegal scheme, and is substantially equally at fault, the plaintiff should be
barred from imposing liability on the defendant.
Id. at 149.
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Securities law cases treating the in pari delicto defense decided since
the Perma Life case generally have accepted the degree of fault analysis.
In Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,300 the court denied the defense of
in pari delicto in a suit by a customer charging his broker with violation
of regulation T. Nevertheless, the court distinguished two cases reach-
ing an opposite result ... on the grounds that in those cases the kind of
fault attributed to the customer went "beyond knowledge of the margin
requirements to concealment or misstatement of material facts." 302 In
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,3°3 the court dealt with the
contention that a tippee should not be able to assert liability against a
tipper broker-dealer who gave a false tip. Relying on the Perma Life
case, the court rejected the in pari delicto defense, noting that in the
usual situation the positions of the tipper and tippee are "not necessarily
equal." 304 It added:
The true insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountainhead
of the confidential information, whereas the tippee or the cus-
tomer may be only one of many who innocently or otherwise
receives a tip, and whose potential for harm is minimal as
compared to that of the original source of the information." 5
The court stated that the policy of discouraging the tipper from making
the initial disclosure "can most readily be achieved by making unavail-
able to him the defense of in pari delicto when sued by his tippee upon
charges based upon alleged misinformation." 306
In a recent case also involving a claim by a customer against a
broker-dealer, the District of Columbia District Court denied the de-
fense of in pari delicto based upon mere knowledge of a regulation T
violation.0 7 It concluded that "mere participation in or knowledge of a
violation without fraud or deceit is not enough to deny the plaintiff
recovery." 308
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart (concurring in part and dissenting in
part) :
Plaintiffs who are truly in pari delicto are those who have themselves violated
the law in cooperation with the defendant.
Id. at 153 (footnote omitted).
300 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
301 Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd
per curiam, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Moscarelli
v. Stature, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
302429 F.2d at 1142 n.10.
303 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
304 Id. at 57.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 57-58.
307 Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677, 680
(D.D.C. 1971) (citing Permna Life Mufflers and distinguishing Moscarelli v. Stammr,
288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), and Judge Friendly's dissent in Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1970)).




The policy judgment the courts have made by using degree of fault
analysis in the in pari delicto cases is consistent with the suggestion in
this Article that degree of fault analysis is also appropriate in cases
involving contribution and indemnity. Both the deterrent and the com-
pensation securities law policies will be advanced by permitting contri-
bution in all cases except where there is a clear difference in fault, since
the entire burden of loss will not be shifted from one guilty party to
another merely through the accidents of jurisdiction or plaintiff's selec-
tion of defendants. In suits for indemnity both deterrence and fairness
will be increased by granting indemnity only in those cases in which the
difference of degree of fault is great.
The policies underlying application of contribution, indemnity, and
in pari delicto doctrines become extremely important to those defendants
whose liability is secondary. Defendants whose liability is primary be-
cause of their direct participation in the fraudulent activity or because
they have violated an independent duty most likely will be judged to
have a degree of fault high enough so that indemnity will not be
awarded them and a defense of in pari delicto will not be available.
Where the liability is based upon theories such as aiding and abetting
or conspiracy, however, the culpability of the various defendants may
be so different that both securities law objectives and fairness can be
achieved by application of sound doctrines of degree of fault. Need for
degree of fault analysis in deciding whether to allow the defense of
in pari delicto, to impose indemnification, or to deny contribution would
arise most clearly if secondary liability is imposed for inaction or for
failure to make proper inquiry (a development which has been opposed
in this Article). Although courts may shrink from the task of deter-
mining relative degrees of fault, evaluation of the relative culpability of
the parities should lead to fair adjustment of the liabilities and rights
of multiple defendants. Since recoveries based upon rule lOb-5 and
other securities law sections and rules seem to stem in large part from
common law tort and restitution doctrines, there seems every reason to
temper securities law liability with considerations of fault and fairness.
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